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31  Introduction
The  current  international  debate  on  debt  relief  for  highly-indebted,  low-
income countries  has led policymakers,  international  development  organiza-
tions and academic economists alike to reaffirm the goal of sustained poverty
reduction as one of the key objectives of adjustment  programs.'  At the same
time, renewed efforts have been made to amend existing macroeconomic  pol-
icy tools  and  develop  new  ones in order  to better  understand the channels
through  which  adjustment  policies  affect  the  poor  and the  possible  trade-
offs  that  poverty-reduction  strategies  may  entail  regarding  the sequencing
of policy reforms-particularly  between short-term stabilization policies and
structural  measures.  This paper presents  an integrated quantitative  macro-
economic  framework  developed  recently  at the World  Bank for the specific
purpose  of analyzing the impact of policy  and exogenous  shocks  on income
distribution,  employment  and poverty in low-income,  highly-indebted  coun-
tries as well  as  middle-income  developing  economies.2 This new framework
(baptized IMMPA,  for Integrated  Macroeconomic  Model for Poverty Analy-
sis) dwells on the extensive analytical  and applied research conducted in aca-
demic  and policy  circles  over the past  two decades  on macroeconomic  and
structural  adjustment  issues  in developing  economies.  It captures  a variety
of channels  through  which stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  policies
affect growth, income  inequality, and poverty in both the short and the long
run.
Our analysis,  as discussed in detail below, differs from existing approaches
in several  dimensions.  It emphasizes,  most notably,  the role of labor market
segmentation  (induced either by government legislation or firms' wage-setting
decisions),  the  role  of  informal  employment  in  the  transmission  of  policy
and  exogenous  shocks to the poor,  and  (in the case  of low-income,  highly-
indebted countries)  the adverse effect  of external debt on private  incentives
to invest.  It  accounts  at  the same time  for  the impact  of different  compo-
'On  December  22,  1999,  the International  Monetary Fund (IMF)  and the World  Bank
endorsed  the  elaboration  of a Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Paper  (PRSP)  as the central
mechanism for  providing  concessional  lending to low-income  countries.  The declared ob-
jective of the PRSP is to  provide  a medium-term  framework  to reduce  poverty and  gen-
erate more  rapid economic growth, with assistance from  bilateral  donors and multilateral
financial institutions.
2We  focus  in this  paper  on  a presentation  of the  prototype  IMMPA  model  for  low-
income  economies.  As discussed in the concluding  section,  most of the building blocks of
the model are  also relevant  for policy analysis  in middle-income  economies.
4nents  of government  expenditure  (on infrastructure,  education,  and health)
on the production process and the accumulation of physical and human cap-
ital by the private  sector.  It also captures  credit  market  imperfections  and
linkages  between  the financial  system  and the real  side  of the economy,  by
relating firms' borrowing needs  (for both working capital and physical capital
formation)  to bank  lending.  Because of its integrated treatment  of the real
and financial  sides,  the model  allows  policy  analysts  to study not only the
impact  of structural  reforms  (such  as  changes  in tariffs  or the composition
of public expenditure)  on relative  prices  and  output,  but also the  effect  of
short-term  stabilization  policies  (such  as  a cut  in domestic  credit  or a  rise
in policy interest rates)  as well as other financial shocks  (such as an outflow
of private  capital  or a rise  in world  interest  rates).  Our detailed  treatment
of the labor market is particularly important to assess the poverty reduction
effects  of adjustment  programs,  because  the poor often generate  their main
source of income from wages,  and the latter depend on available employment
opportunities.  By  distinguishing  between  rural  and  urban sectors  (and  ac-
counting for migration d'ynamics driven  by relative wages),  the model allows
us to study separately  the evolution of poverty in urban and rural areas  and
its relation with output  and employment fluctuations  across sectors.
The remainder  of the  paper is organized  as  follows.  Section II  presents
an overview  of the main  issues that our  analysis  focuses  on  and highlights
areas in which our framework  differs from some of the past and more recent
research  in  the  field.  Section  III  describes  in  detail  the  structure  of  the
prototype  IMMPA  model  for  low-income,  highly-indebted  countries,  con-
sidering  in  turn  production  and  employment,  demand  and  external  trade,
prices,  income  and expenditure,  the financial system,  the public  sector,  the
poverty  and  income  distribution  indicators  that the  model  generates,  and
the link between consumption and income predictions  and household expen-
diture  surveys.  Section  IV discusses  issues  associated  with the  calibration
and solution of the model and the extent to which our parameters and initial
values  can be deemed  "representative"  of a poor,  highly-indebted  economy.
Section  V presents  the simulation results  of various  shocks  (both exogenous
and policy-induced)  and  discusses  their real,  financial,  income  distribution
and poverty  effects.  We  analyze,  in turn,  the short-  and  long-run  impact
of a temporary terms-of-trade  shock,  a permanent  cut in domestic credit  to
the government,  and  a poverty-reduction  program  consisting  of partial  ex-
ternal debt forgiveness  coupled with a reallocation of savings on debt service
payments  to three  alternative  forms  of government  expenditure:  lump-sum
5transfers to households, spending on infrastructure  and outlays on education.
This last  experiment  is of particular interest  in light of the current  interna-
tional  debate  (alluded to earlier)  on the need  for debt  relief for  low-income
countries-conditional  on a productive  use  of associated  savings.  The last
section summarizes  our main results  and suggests various  extensions  of our
analysis.
2  Analytical  Background
Development  macroeconomists  and policy  analysts  in general  use  a variety
of policy tools (ranging from single equations to full-blown econometric mod-
els)  to provide quantitative  policy  assessments.  Within that range  of tools,
our  framework  is closer  in spirit  to  dynamic,  financial  computable  general
equilibrium  (FCGE)  models.  However,  our  approach differs  from the exist-
ing  literature in  important  ways.  The point  of departure  of our  analysis  is
the need to construct  a framework  that allows  analysts to provide appropri-
ate answers  to a variety of policy issues that developing  countries  (including
highly-indebted,  low-income  ones)  are currently facing in designing pro-poor
development  strategies.  For instance, how does resource reallocation induced
by structural policy  shocks  affect income distribution and poverty rates?  To
maximize the impact  of debt relief on the poor, should governments  increase
lump-sum transfers to the poor, or invest in health,  education,  or infrastruc-
ture capital?  Are there trade-offs between stabilization and structural adjust-
ment policies with respect to their impact on employment levels  and poverty,
and if so within what time frame?  What are the implications  of these poten-
tial trade-offs for the sequencing of policy reforms?  Our fundamental premise
is that these  questions can be addressed  in a meaningful manner  only if the
complexity  of the labor  market  structure  is  properly  represented,  the link-
ages between the financial and the real sides that condition the transmission
process  of  macroeconomic  and  structural  policy  shocks  are  well  accounted
for,  and  if the channels  through which  government  expenditure  affects  the
economy  (and  eventually the poor)  are adequately captured.
The  first  important  distinguishing  feature  of our  model  is  its  detailed
specification  of the labor market.  Although it has long been recognized that
the structure of the labor market  can have a major impact on the transmis-
sion of macroeconomic  shocks and adjustment  policies  to economic  activity,
employment,  and relative  prices  (see Ag6nor  (1996,  2000,  2001),  Bodart and
6Le Dem (1996),  and the World Bank (1995)),  the treatment  of this market in
applied policy models has focused on only a narrow set of its well-documented
features-such  as  an economy-wide  rigid minimum wage.  Except  for a  few
exceptions  (see for instance Maechler  and Roland-Host  (1995,  1997)),  insuf-
ficient  attention  has been  paid to the macroeconomic  implications  of alter-
native  sources of labor market  segmentation,  differences  in wage  formation
across various labor categories,  inter-sectoral wage rigidity (as opposed to ag-
gregate wage rigidity),  and feedback  effects between relative prices  and wage
decisions  by price-setting  firms.  All  of these  features  may  have important
implications for understanding the impact of policy and exogenous shocks on
poverty.  Labor  market  segmentation,  in particular,  tends  to restrict  labor
mobility  and can  be  associated  with persistent  wage  differentials;  these,  in
turn, may prevent the reallocation of resources  necessary to cope with exter-
nal and policy-induced shocks.  Because the poor in many countries generate
a significant fraction of their income from labor services,  modeling these fea-
tures of the labor market  is crucial  for  understanding  the impact  of pretty
much  any type of shocks  on poverty in the short,  medium,  and long run.
Our analysis captures some of the important institutional characteristics
of the  urban  labor  market  observed  in  low-  and  middle-income  developing
countries.3 In these countries it is important to distinguish,  in analyzing the
functioning  of the  urban  labor  market,  between  formal  employment  (such
as employment  in large private enterprises  and the public sector)  and infor-
mal employment.  In many cases  (particularly in sub-Saharan  Africa)  public
sector  employment  represents  a  very  large  share  of  formal  sector  employ-
ment.  Formal  employment  in  many  countries  (in  both Latin  America  and
sub-Saharan  Africa)  has  increased  only slowly  in  recent  decades,  whereas
migration  to urban  areas  has  been  extensive.  Informal  urban employment
has  thus increased  dramatically  in  size.4 In  Kenya,  for  instance,  the share
of the informal  sector  in employment  outside agriculture  is  currently  about
60 percent,  whereas in Cameroon  in  1993 it  was estimated  that 57 percent
of the employed  labor  force  worked  in the informal sector  (Fortin,  Marceau
3See  Agenor  (1996)  for  a detailed  overview  of the literature,  and  Bigsten  and Horton
(1998)  for  a  survey  of labor  markets  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  See  also  the  World  Bank
(1995).
4The informal  sector can be defined in various  ways; one  common definition  is that it
includes self-employed  workers  (except  for  professionals)  unpaid  family  workers,  workers
employed  in small firms  (less than,  say,  5 or 6 workers),  and  those working in  the trade
and services sector without  a legally-binding contract.
7and  Savard  (1997)).  In Bangladesh,  90  percent  of the labor  force  is  in the
informal  (nontraded)  sector, mainly in rural areas (Devarajan,  Ghanem,  and
Thierfelder  (1999)).  In Ghana,  between  1980  and  1990,  employment  in the
formal sector declined significantly,  despite a substantial increase  (by almost
50 percent)  of the non-agricultural  labor  force.  Available  estimates  suggest
that much of the expansion in the labor  force was  absorbed by the informal
sector,  whose size  increased  from  36 to 45  percent  of the total (agricultural
and non-agricultural)  labor force.  The urban poor are also disproportionately
employed  in the informal sector.
At the same time, wage formation and the composition of the labor force
tend to  differ  substantially  between  the  formal  and the informal  segments
of  the labor  market.  Whereas  workers  in  the  informal  economy  tend  to
have relatively  low skill  levels  and face flexible  wages,  both  low-  and  high-
skilled  workers  are  found  in the  formal  sector.  Particularly  in the private
formal  urban  economy,  the  use  of relatively  capital-intensive  technologies
implies that skilled labor and physical  capital tend to be  (net) complements,
whereas  they both tend to be substitutes  for unskilled  labor.  As  a result of
both the relative  scarcity  of highly educated  labor  and  its complementary
with  physical  capital,  wages  for skilled  workers  tend to be  high,  relative  to
average  wages  in the economy.5 In  addition, the available evidence  suggests
that firms  may pay higher  wages  to skilled  workers  for efficiency  reasons-
to reduce turnover  costs  (particularly  if hiring, firing  and training costs  are
high) to enhance  productivity,  attract better workers,  and maintain loyalty
and morale.  A large number  of studies focusing on sub-Saharan  Africa  (see
e.g.  Bigsten and Horton  (1998))  and Latin America  have indeed found that
in the manufacturing  industry in these  countries  there is  often a significant
effect  of firm  size on wages,  as  implied by various  efficiency  wage theories.
The phenomenon persists even after controlling for (observable) labor quality
differences  and working conditions.  This suggests that firms may pay more
either to reduce costly labor turnover (larger firms are more capital intensive
and require more educated  labor)  or enhance the level of effort  (which is less
easily observable  and monitorable in larger firms).
Our  framework  captures  all  of these  features  in a stylized  manner.  We
distinguish  between  the formal  and the  informal  components  of the urban
labor  market.  We take  wages  to be  fully  flexible  in the  informal  economy
51n some  countries,  however,  there is  excess  supply of skilled  labor and  a high rate of
open unemployment  for that category  of workers.
8and  assume that labor  is  heterogeneous  in the formal sector,  using  a basic
distinction  between skilled  and unskilled labor.  We  account for both private
and public sector production and employment;  and whereas wages of workers
employed  in the public  sector  and  those working  as unskilled  labor in the
private  sector  are  taken  to  be  fixed  by  government  fiat,  we  assume  that
wages of skilled workers in the private sector are set on the basis of efficiency
wage  considerations.  Although  for  tractability  we  use  a specific  efficiency
wage formulation  (based  on the wage-productivity  link),  our formulation  is
observationally  equivalent to various other specifications.
The second important  feature  of our  framework  is the treatment  of the
financial  system.  In the  "archetype"  poor economy  that we consider in this
paper,  savers  have  access  to only a  limited range  of financial  assets  (essen-
tially money and bank deposits, held both at home and abroad) and commer-
cial  banks play a predominant  role in the financial  intermediation  process.6
Specifically,  we assume that firms are unable to issue tradable claims on their
assets  or future output.  We  also dwell  on some of the existing literature  on
FCGE models and the various channels that they have embedded:  a portfolio
structure that accounts for the impact of interest rates on asset allocation de-
cisions and capital flows (see for instance Robinson (1991),  Adam and Bevan
(1998),  Rosensweig and Taylor (1990),  Thissen (1999,  2000), and Thissen and
Lensink  (2001)),  real balance  effects  on expenditure  (as in Easterly  (1990)),
and linkages  between bank credit  and the supply  side through working cap-
ital needs-as  in  Taylor  (1983),  Bourguignon,  de  Melo,  and  Suwa  (1991),
Bourguignon,  Branson, and de Melo  (1992),  Lewis  (1992,  1994),  and Fargeix
and Sadoulet  (1994).  For instance,  we explicitly  incorporate the bank lend-
ing rate into the effective price of labor faced by firms that must finance their
working capital requirements  prior to the sale of output.  This link turns out
to be a crucial channel  through which the real and financial sectors interact.
But we depart from the specification  adopted in many existing studies in two
important  ways.  First,  we provide  a full  stock  treatment  of portfolio  deci-
sions  (as  opposed  to the flow  approach  used  in several  studies)  within the
context  of a Tobin-type  asset demand  system.  Second,  we capture  the role
of balance sheet  (or net worth)  effects in the determination  of bank lending
rates, in  addition to funding costs,  by explicitly  modeling the  "finance  pre-
mium"  along the lines of recent research on credit market  imperfections  and
6The IMMPA  application  to Brazil  described by Agenor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,  and van
der Mensbrugghe  (2003)  provides  a richer  description of the financial  system.
9the  importance  of collateral,  as  discussed  by Ag6nor  and Aizenman  (1998,
1999b),  Bernanke,  Gertler,  and Gilchrist (2000),  Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
and Izquierdo  (2000).
A third distinguishing feature of our approach is its emphasis  on the neg-
ative  effect  of external debt  on private  investment.  Such  a relationship  can
result from various  channels,  including disincentive effects  associated  with  a
large  external  debt.  Indeed,  several  studies,  evolving  from Krugman  (1988)
and Sachs  (1989),  have argued that  an excessive amount  of debt raises  ex-
pectations  of higher  future  (implicit  or  explicit)  taxation  and  confiscation
risk to satisfy debt  service payments.  This, in turn, creates  disincentives  to
invest-most  notably  by lowering  the  expected  after-tax  rate  of return  on
capital  (Hernandez-Cata  (2000))-and may generate  capital flight and lower
net private capital inflows.7 Studies by Elbadawi, Ndulu, and Ndungu  (1997),
Iyoha  (2000),  and Pattillo,  Poirson,  and  Ricci  (2002),  provide  some  recent
empirical evidence  of a negative  relationship between external  debt and pri-
vate capital formation for sub-Saharan  Africa.  lyoha  (2000)  for  instance,  in
a study covering  the period 1970-94,  found that the ratio of external  debt to
GDP had a significant and negative effect  on gross domestic investment.  Pat-
tillo,  Poirson,  and  Ricci  (2002),  in a study covering  93 developing  countries
over  1969-98,  found that on average  external  debt begins to have  a negative
impact  on growth  when it  reaches  about  160-170  percent  of exports  or  35-
40 percent  of GDP.  In the present  model,  we capture this adverse  incentive
effect  by introducing  a nonlinear  effect  of the ratio of debt  service  to taxes
on private investment.  As  a result,  the  higher the initial  level  of debt,  the
stronger the negative marginal  effect of a further increase  in foreign borrow-
ing  on the propensity  to invest.  Put  differently,  the  debt overhang  in our
setting provides  a justification  for debt reduction on efficiency  grounds.
Finally,  our approach  differs  from existing studies  by accounting  explic-
itly for  the channels  through  which various types of public investment  out-
lays  affect  the  economy.  Economists  and  policymakers  have  long  known
that  different  forms  of public  investment  can have  different  effects  on  out-
put  and employment,  but the  different  channels  through which  alternative
forms  of public  spending  operate  have  seldom  been  incorporated  explicitly
in  applied macroeconomic  models used  for development  policy  analysis.  In
our framework,  investment  in infrastructure  (or,  rather,  the  stock of public
7As pointed out by Husain (1997),  the taxation ability of the debtor government  may be
important in determining the magnitude of the debt overhang effect on private investment.
10capital  in infrastructure)  affects  directly  the  level  of production in the  pri-
vate sector-and thus the marginal productivity of primary factors employed
in that sector-whereas  public investment  in education  has  a direct  impact
on  unskilled  workers'  decision  to  acquire  skills  (as  in  Jung  and Thorbecke
(2001)).  This effect operates in addition,  of course,  to movements in relative
wages  across skill categories  and the initial level of individual wealth,  which
acts  as a constraining  factor  in the presence  of restrictions  in accessing  the
credit market.  Our view is that this distinction  is essential  to understanding
how the savings created by debt relief should be allocated by governments  (or
donor agencies)  concerned  with maximizing their poverty-reduction  effects.
3  Structure  of IMMPA
Given the type of policy issues that we wish to address,  and the complexity
of some of the channels  highlighted  above  (regarding  notably the structure
of the labor  market  and  the linkages  between  the real  and  financial  sides
of the economy),  our  strategy  has  been  to specify  our  framework  in  a  rel-
atively parsimonious  way by restricting  its various  building  blocks  to what
we  believe  to be essential  components.  In  this section  we review  these  var-
ious  building blocks  and consider  in turn the production  side,  employment,
the demand  side,  external  trade,  sectoral  and  aggregate  prices,  income  for-
mation,  the  financial  sector  and  asset  allocation  decisions,  and the  public
sector.  We  specify behavioral  functions  for each  of the six broad categories
of agents  included in  IMMPA:  households  (disaggregated  by  levels, of skills
and  location  into various  types  of rural  and urban  households),  firms,  the
government,  the central bank, commercial  banks, and the rest of the world.
We also discuss the poverty and income distribution indicators that we use as
a basis for analyzing the effects of our various simulation experiments on the
poor,  as well as the links between the model's predictions  and household  ex-
penditure surveys.  Throughout  the discussion,  we often use  "generic"  forms
to specify functional  relationships;  explicit  functional  forms  (as well  as  vari-
able names  and definitions)  are provided  in Appendices  A  and B and their
exact specification  in the computer simulation program are provided in Chen
et  al.  (2001)).  Finally,  as  indicated  earlier,  we  focus  in this  paper  on the
prototype  IMMPA  model that we  have  designed with  low-income  countries
in  mind,  leaving  for  a  companion  paper  (see  Ag6nor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,
and van  der  Mensbrugghe  (2003))  the modified  version  that we  have  built
11with some specific characteristics  of middle-income developing  countries.
3.1  Production
In many low-income  countries,  the majority  of the poor  lives in rural areas;
it is  therefore  essential  for  a framework  whose  aim is to help policymakers
design poverty-reduction programs to be able to trace differences  in economic
performance  in the rural and urban sectors.  We therefore  begin with a dis-
tinction  on the production  side  between  the rural and  urban  sectors.  The
rural economy is itself divided between a tradable sector, which consists solely
of a homogeneous  good  sold abroad,  and  a nontraded  goods  sector,  which
produces  a (composite)  good sold  only domestically  (see Figure  1).  The ra-
tionale that underlies this distinction can be found in the available evidence
on the structure  of the rural  labor  market,  which suggests  the existence  of
an often large wage differential  between workers employed  in the production
of predominantly  exported  agricultural goods and workers producing. mainly
for the  domestic  market-many  of whom  are  involved  in subsistence  agri-
culture  (see  for  instance  Bigsten  and Horton  (1998)).  Because  the poverty
implications of such differentials  can be large,  our strategy is to model them
separately.
Although  income  in the  urban  economy  tends  on average  to be  higher
than in the rural sector,  the incidence  of poverty has increased  significantly
(and sometimes  dramatically)  in urban  areas in many developing  countries.
Concomitantly,  the informal  economy  has  grown  in size in  these countries,
in part  as  a result  of the  lack  of employment  opportunities  in  the  formal
sector  and  the  pervasiveness  of labor  market  segmentation.  We  account
for these characteristics  by including both formal and informal components
when  specifying  urban  production.  Furthermore,  we  separate  the  formal
urban economy into production of private goods  (which  are sold abroad and
domestically)  and a public good,  as discussed below.
3.1.1  Rural Production
The rural  sector  produces  two  goods;  one  traded,  one  nontraded.  Land
available  for  each  of these  activities  is  assumed  to  be in fixed  supply  and
there is no market to trade property claims on it.  Gross output of nontraded
goods, XAN,  and exported  agricultural goods, XAT,  are given by the sum of
12value added  (VAN  and  VAT,  respectively)  and intermediate  consumption:
XAN  =  VAN  + XAN  aiAN,  for i = AN, AT, I,  P,  G  (1)
XAT  =  VAT  +  XAT  aiAT,  for i = AN, AT,I ,  P,  G  (2)
where the aij are conventionally-defined  input-output  coefficients  (sales from
sector  i to sector j)  and AN,  AT,  I, P,  G are used in what  follows to refer,
respectively,  to the nontraded  agricultural  sector,  the  traded  agricultural
sector,  the informal sector,  the private urban sector, and the public  sector.
Value  added  in  each  sector  is  assumed  to  be  produced  with  a  Cobb-
Douglas  (CD)  function  of land,  LAN,  and  a composite  factor,  defined  as
a  constant  elasticity  of substitution  (CES)  function  that  depends  on  the
number  of  unskilled  rural  workers  employed  (UAN  in the  nontraded-good
sector  and  UAT  in the traded-good  sector)  and  the economy-wide  stock of
public  physical capital  (KG,  which is defined below):
*VAN =  CD[LANAN, CES(UAN, KG)],  (3)
VAT  =  CD[LANAT, CES(UAT, KG)].  (4)
As noted above, we  assume that land is a fixed input in each sector;  and
for simplicity, we normalize  the area of land allocated to production to unity
in what follows.  Given the CD specification,  agricultural  production exhibits
decreasing  returns to scale in the remaining  (composite)  input.
The introduction  of KG in the production functions  (3)  and (4)  is based
on the view that  (cumulative)  public  investment  in the economy  improves
the productivity of private firms  and other  production  units in agriculture,
because  it  facilitates  not  only trade  and  domestic  commerce  but  also  the
production  process  itself.  Thus,  our concept  of public  capital  includes  not
only roads  and  public  transportation  that may  increase  access  to markets,
but  also power  plants  and  similar  public  goods  that  may  contribute  to  an
increase in productivity.
As  discussed  below,  the private,  formal  urban sector  produces  a single
tradable good  that may  be  either  sold  domestically  or  abroad.  The struc-
ture of the rural  economy  by contrast  is rather  different:  we  assume  that
production  of the  rural  traded  good  (XAT)  is  exclusively  allocated  to  ex-
ports (see below).  In contrast, the nontraded agricultural  good is exclusively
13produced  for  the domestic  market  (XAN  = DAN).  The reason for  choosing
this approach is that in many poor countries,  there is often a sharp contrast
between the  "external"  component  of the agricultural  sector, where  produc-
tion is  mostly  targeted  to exports,  and  the  "domestic"  component,  where
production  is targeted  mainly toward  domestic consumers.  The production
process,  access  to bank  credit,  and wage  formation  mechanisms  often  differ
significantly  across these  components,  making the assumption  of a smooth
production possibility frontier  (with a conventional  concave shape)  inappro-
priate.  These modeling choices are obviously important for the interpretation
of some of the simulation results  discussed below.
3.1.2  Urban Informal Production
Gross  production  in the  urban informal  sector,  XI,  is given  as the sum of
value added, VI,  and intermediate consumption,  with value added  given as a
function  of the number  of unskilled  workers  employed  in the informal  econ-
omy,  Ul, with decreasing returns to scale:
XI = VI  +  XI Eai,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G  (5)
where
VI = aex, Upl,  cxj > °,  ° < ,l3x  < 1.  (6)
Moreover,  given what the available evidence suggests regarding the degree
of labor  intensity  of production  in the informal  sector,  we take  3x,  to be
relatively  high in our policy experiments.
3.1.3  Production of public goods  and services
Gross  production  of public  goods  and  services  (or  public  good,  for  short),
denoted  XG,  is given by the sum of value  added,  VG,  and intermediate con-
sumption.  Production  of value  added  requires  both types of labor  (skilled
and unskilled)  and is  given by a two-level  CES function.  At the lower  level
unskilled  workers,  UG,  and  skilled workers,  SG,  combine  to produce  "effec-
tive"  employment in the public sector;  and at the second level, effective labor
and public capital,  KG combine to produce net output:
XG = VC  + XG  aiG,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G,  (7)
14where
VG = CES[CES(SG,UG),KG].  (8)
Employment  levels of both categories  of workers are treated  as predeter-
mined  policy variables.  This specification  of the production  process  of the
public sector good makes it possible to analyze the effects of changes in gov-
ernment  employment.  Public sector  layoffs,  for  instance,  will  influence  the
rest  of the economy  both through  quantity  effects  on the  labor  market  as
well as a reduction  in public sector output.
Note also that, as indicated below, public sector wages for skilled workers
are set equal  to the efficiency  wage paid to that category  of workers  in the
private  formal sector.  Wages  for unskilled  workers  in the public sector  are,
by contrast, set equal to the minimum  wage;  unskilled  workers are therefore
"off"  their supply of labor.  We  will  assume  that  "excess"  employment  (or
disguised  unemployment)  of unskilled labor prevails  in the public sector  (so
that output is never constrained),  as documented in some studies of the labor
market in developing  countries.8
3.1.4  Urban Formal Private Production
As with the production  of the public  good,  private  formal  production  also
employs  skilled  and  unskilled  labor.  In  addition,  physical  capital  is  also
included  as an input  in the production  process.  An important  step in spec-
ifying  the  production  technology  consists  of defining  the  degree  of substi-
tutability among inputs.  We assume-as suggested  by some of the empirical
evidence-that skilled labor and private physical capital have a higher degree
of complementarity  (lower  degree of substitution)  than physical  capital and
unskilled  workers.  In order to account  explicitly for  these differences  in the
degree  of substitutability  among inputs, we adopt a nested CES  production
structure.  Specifically,  gross  production of the private formal-urban  sector,
Xp,  is taken  to be given  by the sum  of value added,  Vp,  and  intermediate
consumption:
Xp =Vp+XPEaip,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G,  (9)
where
VP = CES{CES[CES(ef.Sp, Kp), Up], KG},  (10)
8See  Agenor  (1996),  who discusses  the role of political factors  in the determination of
public sector employment.
15and ef,  as discussed  below,  denotes the  level of on-the-job  effort  provided
by skilled workers.  At the lowest level  of equation  (10),  the effective  supply
of skilled labor, ef.Sp,  and private  capital,  KP, are used in the production
of the composite input T2 (assuming a low elasticity of substitution between
them).  At the second  level,  this composite input  is used,  together  with un-
skilled labor,  Up, to produce the composite input T1. With this specification
it  is  possible to choose  a  higher  elasticity  of substitution  between  T2,  and
unskilled  workers,  Up.  In  other  words,  whereas  skilled  labor  and  private
physical  capital  are essentially  complements,  either  one of these inputs  is  a
substitute  to unskilled  labor  in the  production process.  The  final  layer  of
this nested CES has T1 and KG  (the stock of government  capital)  as inputs
in the production of private  formal urban output.
Given our  assumption that both the public  and  informal  goods  are not
traded (that is, they are sold only on the domestic market), the private formal
urban good is the only component of urban production that can be exported
abroad.  In line with conventional  CGE models  (see,  for instance, Dervis,  De
Melo,  and  Robinson  (1982),  Devarajan  et  al.  (1997),  and Robinson  et  al.
(1999)),  we assume that firms  choose to allocate their output  to exports  or
to the domestic market according to a production possibility frontier,  defined
by a Constant  Elasticity of Transformation  (CET)  function:
XP = CET(Ep,DP)  (11)
Equation  (11)  states that  output,  Xp,  produced  according  to equation
(9),  is  allocated  either  to  exports,  EP, or the  domestic  market,  Dp.  The
actual  levels  of each  component  are shown  later to depend  on the relative
prices of exported and domestic  goods,  in standard  fashion.
3.2  Wages,  Employment,  Migration,  and Skills Acqui-
sition
As  mentioned  earlier,  there are two types  of workers  in this  model:  skilled
and unskilled.  In practice,  of course,  there is a continuum  of skills,  but one
may want to think of our distinction  as a broad one that suffices for analytical
purposes.  Unskilled  workers  may be employed  either  in the rural economy,
UR, or in the urban economy,  Uu, whereas  skilled workers are employed  only
16in the urban economy (see Figure 2).9  We also assume that skilled workers are
not employed in the informal economy either-perhaps as a result of signaling
considerations,  as discussed  later.  In practice,  there may obviously be many
cases  in which  (semi-)  skilled  workers take part in the informal  labor force.
However,  their productivity  should  not  differ  much  from that  of unskilled
workers,  at least  in part because monitoring  is relatively  easier than in the
formal  economy (this being in turn related to the smaller  size of production
units in the informal  sector).  As  a result,  modeling them differently  would
not substantially alter a broad range of simulation results.
3.2.1  Rural Wages and Employment
The available empirical evidence on wages in the rural economy of many low-
income  developing  countries suggests  that there is a significant  discrepancy
between  wages  paid in the export sector  (cash  crops  and other agricultural
products),  and wages paid in the nontraded  sector.  Because of higher wages
in the export  sector, all workers  in rural  areas will opt to seek  employment
there  first.  In  general,  nominal  wages  in the  export  sector,  WAT,  can  be
taken to be indexed either on the value added price or gross output price in
that sector,  or on the economy-wide  consumer price,  so that
WAT  =  WAT(PINDAT)iAT,  (12)
where PINDAT = PVAT,  PXAT, or PLEV, and 0 <  indAT  <  1, with PVAT
(PXAT)  being the price of value  added  (gross output)  in the export  sector,
and PLEV the consumer price index, which are defined later.
In the simulations reported below, we take the degree of indexation to be
perfect  with  respect  to the price  of value  added  (as a result,  say,  of strong
bargaining  power of workers in that sector),  so that PINDAT = PVAT,  and
indAT  =  1.  Thus, the product  wage,  WAT,  is taken to be fixed  in real terms
and firms  are assumed to hire workers up to the optimal level given by their
labor  demand  curve.  The  profit-maximizing  demand  function  for  labor in
the export sector,  UAT,  can be shown to be given by
1
d  _  +lPXAAJT  -XAT  /XAT 
1+PXAT  WAT
wTT\  PXAT'WA UAT=  VAT  1 +ILA_1)iWAT  aeXXAT  hrAT  /  PVA
(13)
9This is of course a simplification,  as  there are  some  firms,  located  in the rural  area,
which  may require skilled labor.
17Equation  (13)  indicates  that labor demand  in the rural export  sector  is
positively related to the level of net output,  VAT,  and negatively  related to
the effective  product wage,  (1 +  IL_,)WAT.  Labor demand does not depend
directly on the price of the exported  agricultural  good,  PXAT  (which  is pro-
portional to the value added price,  as shown below in equation (47)), because
the nominal wage rate paid to workers,  WAT,  varies proportionally to PVAT
in  order  to  keep the  real  wage  rate  fixed  at  WAT.  Again,  the  assumption
of perfect  real  (product)  wage rigidity  is not necessarily  appropriate  for  all
countries;  there  are  cases  where partial  indexation  of nominal wages  might
be more appropriate.  The assumption of full indexation can be easily relaxed
in the IMMPA  software for practical  applications.
Note  also that the product wage  rate is multiplied  by  (1 +  IL-1 ),  where
IL-,  is the one-period  lagged bank lending rate, to account for the fact that
firms  in this sector rely on working capital  to pay  wages in  advance  of the
sale of output.  As  a result, firms  consider the  effective price of labor,  which
includes  the  cost  of borrowing,  when making  labor  hiring  decisions.'0 We
assume that the cost of credit  specified in loan contracts  negotiated  for the
current period is based on the interest rate prevailing  in the previous period.
The supply  of labor to the nontraded  agricultural  sector  is  determined
residually,  as  the  number  of  workers  who  are  unable  to  find  a job  in the
better-paying  sector seek employment  in the nontraded  sector:
UAN  =  UR-UUAT.  (14)
The wage rate  in the nontraded  agricultural  sector is flexible  and deter-
mined so as to equate labor demand (derived from standard profit maximiza-
tion conditions),  UAdN,  and labor supply,  given by (14).  The market-clearing
equilibrium product  wage,  WAN,  is thus given  by
WA  3 A(l  - 7A)  (_V+1PxAN  8AN
WANV-  oXAN1XAN  VXAANV  +PXANN  where WAN  =  PV  (15)
aXAN  WUAN)  /IA
The size  of the labor  force  in the  rural sector,  UR,  is  predetermined  at
any given  point in time.  Over time,  UR grows  at the exogenous  population
'0There is a large literature emphasizing  the role of interest rates in a credit-in-advance
economy  on the supply  side;  New Structuralist  economists  (see  e.g.  Taylor  (1983))  have
been particularly  strong  advocates  of the necessity  to take  this effect  into account  when
specifying  macroeconomic models.  See also Izquierdo  (2000)  for  a more recent discussion.
18growth rate, net of worker migration to urban areas, MIGR:
UR =  UR,  1(1 +  9R) - MIGR.  (16)
In  line with  the  traditional  analysis  of Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),  the
incentives  to  migrate  are  taken  to  depend  negatively  on  the  ratio  of the
average expected consumption wage in rural areas to that prevailing in urban
areas.  We assume that costs associated with migration or other frictions may
delay the migration process,  introducing  persistence in migration  flows.
Unskilled  workers  in the urban economy  may be employed  either in the
formal  sector,  in  which case they  are paid  a minimum  wage,  WM,  or they
can enter the informal  economy and receive  the market-determined  wage in
that sector,  Wl.  When rural workers  make the decision to migrate to urban
areas, they are uncertain as to which type of job they will be able to get,  and
therefore  weigh  wages  in each  sector  by the probability  of finding  a job  in
that sector.  They also take into account  expected  wages  in the rural sector
when making migration decisions.  Suppose,  for simplicity,  that the rural la-
bor market operates  as a sequential  "auction"  market-all rural workers  are
laid-off  at the end of each production  period  and re-hired  randomly  at the
beginning of the next.  In such conditions, the probability of employment  in
each sector subject to entry restrictions  (that  is, sectors where employment
is  demand  determined)  can be approximated  by prevailing  employment  ra-
tios.  Finally, potential migrants also consider what their expected purchasing
power in rural and urban areas will be, depending on whether they stay in the
rural sector and consume the  "typical"  basket  of goods  of rural households,
or migrate  and consume the  "typical"  urban basket of goods.
Combining these hypotheses implies that the average expected urban con-
sumption  wage  is  a  weighted  average  of the minimum  wage  in the formal
sector  and the going wage in the informal sector,  deflated  by an urban con-
sumption price index,  PUU  (defined  below)."1 The weights  are given by Ou
and  1 - Ou,  where Ou  is the probability  of finding a job in the urban formal
sector.  The expected, unskilled urban real wage for the current period, Ewu,
is thus
Ewu  = OUWM,p1  +  (1 - Ou)W1,-1 (17)
PUU,-1
" 1The weights  of each  type  of good  in the price index represent  consumption  patterns
for urban unskilled workers  in the base period  (see the discussion below).
19where  Ou  is  measured  by the initial proportion  of unskilled  workers  in the
private formal sector, relative to the total number of unskilled urban workers
net  of  government  employment  prevailing  in the  previous  period  (that  is,
Ou  =  (Up,o/(Uu,o - UG,o)).' 2 A  similar  reasoning  is  used  to  calculate  the
expected rural consumption  real wage, EWA:
EWA  =  ORWAT,-1  +  (1  - OR)WAN,-1
FR,-1
where  PR is the consumption  index for the rural sector  (defined  below)  and
OR is approximated by the initial proportion of the rural unskilled labor force
employed  in the export sector  (that  is,  OR  =  UAT,o/UR,o).' 3 The migration
function can therefore be specified as
MIGR = UR,-lAm  amIn ( Ewu)] + (1-Am)UR''  MIGR-1,  (18)
[1  (EWA  AmUR, 2 MIR,  (8
where  0 < Am  < 1 measures the speed of adjustment  and aM > 0 measures
the elasticity of migration flows with respect to expected wages.
It should be noted that we have abstracted  in the above discussion  from
the role of risk aversion in individual migration decisions, by focusing on  "ex-
pected income"  differentials rather than "expected  utility"  differentials.  For
a risk-averse  worker,  for  instance,  the probability of employment  is  a more
important  determinant  of migration than the wage rate.  More generally,  we
have  not  captured  in  our  specification  some  of the  other factors  that  may
affect  the  decision  to  migrate,  as emphasized  in the recent  analytical  and
empirical  literature  (see for  instance  Stark  (1991)  and Ghatak,  Levine  and
Price (1996)).  Wage uncertainty in agriculture or the urban sector (resulting,
in the former case,  from output variability,  and in the latter,  from imperfect
information  about  labor market  conditions),  income inequality  and relative
deprivation  in  the rural  sector,  the joint  nature  of the  decision  process  in
households,  and the lack of access to credit markets,  may all affect migration
1 2Note  that  this  expression  for  Ou  assumes  that  there  is no  "auctioning"  of  public
sector jobs, that is, the government  does not turn over its employees  over every period as
occurs in the private  sector.  This assumption  captures the view that public jobs are not
"randomly"  offered but result  rather from  various  non-economic  considerations,  such  as
political  patronage.  If there  is  turnover  in the public  sector,  however,  the probability  of
finding a job would be (Up,o  + UG,O)/UU,O,  instead of (Up,o(Uu,o  -UG,O).
'3In  principle,  both  Ou  and  OR  vary  over  time.  In  the  simulations  reported  below,
however,  we treat  them as constant.
20decisions  and lead potential migrants to alter their decision  to move."4 For
instance, imperfect  (and costly) information about urban labor market condi-
tions may lead potential migrants to attach a greater weight  to the available
information regarding the rural sector and may lead them to postpone their
decision to move-despite the existence of a large  (expected)  wage differen-
tial." 5 However,  some of these factors  may be country-specific  and we have
opted in building our prototype framework to focus on a more parsimonious
specification that highlights the role of relative income opportunities.
3.2.2  Urban Unskilled Wages and Employment
The public sector is assumed to hire an exogenous level of unskilled workers,
UG.  For simplicity, the wage rate paid by the government to unskilled workers
is set at the same level as the wage rate paid to that category of labor in the
private formal sector.  Furthermore,  we assume that there is a legally-binding
minimum wage in place,  which  is indexed to either the consumer  price index
or an alternative price:
WM  = WM(PINDM)  nd M ,
where PINDM = PLEV for instance,  and 0 < indM < 1. In the simulation
exercises  reported later,  we  assume that the minimum wage is fully indexed
(so that indM = 1)  on the price of the composite factor  T1.'6
Labor demand  in the formal private  sector,  Ud,  is  determined  by firms'
profit  maximization.  Given that formal  private sector  firms  also borrow  to
finance  their wage  bill prior to the sale of output, the effective price of labor
includes  again the bank lending rate;  thus
Ud  = T  3XP1  ap  m Up  =  T  ((1  + ILL)wm  PXPI  ,  where WM  =-  (19)
\~~(i  +  axPIj  PT,
As  was  the case  for  the rural sector  (and in order  to avoid corner  solu-
tions),  we  assume that  the wage  rate paid to  unskilled  labor  in the formal
14Stark (1991)  also emphasized that individual migration can be the outcome of a family
decision,  often as  a response  to uninsurable  risks.
1 5We also abstract from the negative  externalities associated with rural to urban migra-
tion, such  as congestion  costs or pollution in shanty towns.
"6An alternative  would  be to assume that the minimum wage is fixed  in nominal  terms
(indM =  0).  As is well  known,  simulation results of particular  shocks may  differ  signifi-
cantly  under the two  assumptions (see for instance  Devarajan,  Ghanem,  and  Thierfelder
(1999)).
21urban  sector is  systematically  greater than  the  real  wage  rate  paid  in the
informal  sector.  Consequently,  unskilled  urban  workers  will first  seek em-
ployment  in the private  formal  sector.  The  actual  level  of employment  in
that sector  is determined  according to equation  (19).  The remainder  of the
urban unskilled labor  force,  Uu,  will thus  seek  employment  in the informal
economy,  where there are no barriers to entry:
Uj = UU-UP-UG.  (20)
From  (6),  the demand for  labor in the informal sector  is given  by UI  =
3px(Vj1 /wI),  where  w,  is  the  product  wage  defined  as  W,/PV 1. Because
the informal  labor  market  clears  continuously  (Ud  =  U,),  the equilibrium
product  wage is given by
WI  = ,XI  VI  where w  W  (21)
The urban unskilled labor supply,  Uu, grows as a result of "natural" urban
population growth and migration of unskilled  labor from the rural economy,
as discussed  earlier.  Moreover,  a fraction of the urban unskilled population
acquires  skills  (SKL)  and  leaves  the  unskilled  labor  force  to  increase  the
supply of skilled labor  in the economy.  We make the additional assumption
that individuals  are born unskilled,  and therefore natural  urban population
growth. (not  resulting from migration  or  skills acquisition  factors)  is  repre-
sented by urban unskilled population growth only, at the rate gu.  Thus, the
size of the urban unskilled labor supply evolves  according to
Uu =  Uu,-(l +  gu) +  MIGR - SKL.  (22)
We treat the growth rate of the urban unskilled population endogenously
in our  framework.  We do  so by  dwelling  on the several studies  have  docu-
mented the existence  of a negative  association  between  population  growth
rates and income  levels;  fertility rates tend to fall  as the level of income  in-
creases  (see for instance Barro  and Becker  (1989),  and Becker,  Murphy  and
Tamura  (1990)  for the growth implications  of this relationship).  Specifically,
we  assume that the growth rate of the urban unskilled population is related
to a distributed lag of current  and past values  of the ratio of average income
in the urban economy for skilled and unskilled workers.  Assuming that these
lags follow a declining geometric pattern and using the Koyck transformation,
22we get
gu =  Aga&gu[ [U  (  +  ()UP  +  UG)WM] /UU-U  > 
(23)
where  7gu  >  0  measures the elasticity  of the  growth  rate of the urban  un-
skilled  population with respect to the wage ratio.
The  acquisition  of skills  by unskilled  workers  is  assumed to depend  on
three factors:  a) relative expected  consumption wages of skilled to unskilled
urban  workers  (as a proxy for the future stream of earnings  associated with
higher levels of education);  b) the government stock of education capital, KE,
which affects the ability to invest in skills;  and c) the average level of wealth
held by each unskilled worker, which plays an important role in the presence
of liquidity constraints.
Consider  first  the  effect  of wages.  In  case  they  acquire  skills,  current
unskilled workers  expect to earn wage  Ws if they are employed  (with proW
ability  Os)  and  nothing  if they are unemployed.  The  purchasing  power  of
this wage  is obtained  by deflating  it by the skilled  consumption price index,
Pus,-,  (defined  below):
EwS = 0  WS  I,
Pus,-1,
where  Os  is,  as  before,  approximated  by  the initial  ratio of the number  of
skilled workers employed in the private sector, over the total number of skilled
workers that are not employed in the public sector seeking a job in the private
sector (that is,  Os =  Sp,O/(SO  - SG,-O)).
In contrast, if they remain  unskilled,  they expect  to get the average  un-
skilled  wage,  which  is  a weighted  average  of the  minimum  wage  WM  and
the informal  wage  rate.  Assuming,  again,  that  there  is no job turnover  in
the public sector,  the average expected  real  wage is given  by (17),  which  is
repeated  here for convenience:
OUWM',-  +  ( 1-OU)W,,_
Ewu  - Puu,-1
with Ou  as defined above.
Consider now the effect of initial wealth.  As can be inferred, for instance,
from various studies in the endogenous growth literature (see for instance De
Gregorio  (1996)), the existence of constraints in obtaining credit to fund the
23cost of acquiring skills may completely outweigh the impact of relative wages
and the prevailing stock of government  capital  in infrastructure on workers'
decisions.  Indeed,  in the framework  that we  consider  here,  only firms  have
access  to  bank  credit  (see  the  discussion  below);  no matter  how  high  the
wage  differential  is  or  is  expected  to be,  workers  simply  cannot  borrow  to
finance  human  capital  accumulation."7 To  capture  the  existence  of these
credit  constraints we  assume that the decision to acquire  skills is a function
of the  (lagged)  ratio  of the  level  of wealth  of  urban  formal  and  informal
unskilled households divided by the number of unskilled workers in the urban
sector,  (WTUI +  WTUF)/UU (with WT defined  below).  Admittedly,  this is
a rather  simplistic  way  of modeling  these  frictions;  an alternative  (but less
tractable)  approach  would  be to assume that  access to the credit  market  is
subject to a threshold effect,  with financial wealth playing a "signaling"  role
because of workers'  ability to pledge  a fraction of it as  collateral.
Given these three  effects,  the flow increase in the supply of skilled labor
can be written as:
SKL  A5 [(WTUI_1 + WTUF,l)  Ced.  K  (EWs)  w(KE)UEI(24)
+(1-As)SKL_1,
where  0 <  As  <  1,  Ke  is a shift parameter,  and  /edu  > 0.  For  simplicity,  we
treat  as constant the cost of acquiring  skills  (as measured  by the number of
years of schooling multiplied  by the average  cost of education  per year).
Public  investment  in education,  IE  (which  is treated as  exogenous),  de-
termines the rate at which the stock of public capital in education  grows over
time:
KE =  KE,-1(1 - 6E)  +  1E,  (25)
PQp,,'
where 0  < BE  < 1 is  a depreciation  rate.  We assume that only  the private
good  is used to invest in education  and therefore deflate nominal  investment
by the demand price PQp  (defined below).
17This assumption is well supported by the evidence on the composition of bank credit in
low-income  countries, which suggests that only a small fraction of bank loans  is allocated
to households.
243.2.3  Urban Skilled  Wages  and Employment
As indicated earlier,  we  assume that wage-setting  behavior for skilled labor
is based on efficiency considerations.  Specifically,  we assume that in order to
provide  incentives  for employees  to work  and avoid shirking,  firms  must set
a sufficiently  high (product)  wage.  Along the lines of the specific  functional
form derived  by Agenor and Aizenman  (1999a),  we assume that the level of
effort  skilled  workers  provide  depends  negatively  on  the ratio  of their real
opportunity cost,  Q 2w, to their  consumption wage, that is, the nominal wage
Ws deflated by the skilled consumption  price index, Pus:
ef  =1-efm  ne  where  'Yef  > 0,  (26)
[Ws/Pus]  f(6
and where  0 < efm  < 1 denotes the  "minimum"  level of effort.  The oppor-
tunity cost  of effort  is taken to be constant  in what follows.
Firms determine  the levels  of skilled  and unskilled  employment,  as well
as the product wage  for skilled  labor,  ws,  so as to maximize  profits, taking
as given the real minimum wage paid and the production technology  (10).  It
can be established that the demand for skilled labor  is given by
r~~,dm(1~  /
3 XP2  17XP2  W
p=  (  1 IL-,)WsaPXP2  ,  where Ws  =  PT2 (27)
whereas the optimal wage-setting equation  is given by
13XP2'Yef(1  - ef)  (  T2 )  +PXP2 PUS  (28)
a=PXP2  tef  -Sp)  PT2
Note that  in this equation the ratio of the consumption  price  index for
skilled workers,  Pus, over the price of the composite input, PT2,  appears be-
cause firms set the product wage whereas  effort depends on the consumption
wage.  This creates an important channel  (seldom accounted for in empirical
models)  through which changes  in relative prices affect  wage formation.
Given that  firms set  wages and  are  on their  labor demand  curve,  open
skilled unemployment may emerge.  The rate of skilled unemployment, UNEMPs,
is  given by the ratio of skilled  workers  who are not  employed either by the
private  or the public sector,  divided by the total population  of skilled  work-
25ers: 18
UNEMPs = S-SG-  SdP  (29)
Note that here we  assume that skilled workers  who  are unable to find  a
job in the formal  economy  do not  enter  the informal  economy,  in contrast
to  unskilled  workers.  In principle,  any  worker  who is  not  hired  in the for-
mal  economy  could  get  a job  in the informal  economy  at  the  going  wage.
However,  there  are several  reasons  why they may choose  not  to do so.  An
important  consideration  may  be that  skilled  workers  are  concerned  about
possible adverse  signaling  effects  associated  with  employment  in the infor-
mal economy and may prefer instead to remain openly unemployed (Gottfries
and McCormick  (1995)).  Indeed, the existence of "luxury"  unemployment  is
a well-documented  feature  of the labor  market in developing  countries.
The skilled labor force evolves  over time according  to:
S = S-i + SKL.  (30)
Because we assumed that workers are born unskilled, the skilled workforce
does not grow at the natural growth rate of the urban population, but rather
at the rate at which unskilled workers choose to acquire skills.  Note also that,
for simplicity,  we assume  no  "de-skilling"  (or obsolescence)  effect,  although
this could be easily captured.
It is important, to conclude this discussion of wage formation mechanisms,
to return to our assumption that skilled workers'  wage  is determined  on the
basis  of  an  efficiency  effect  of compensation  on productivity.  In  practice,
it is  notoriously  difficult  to discriminate  among various  forms  of efficiency
wage theories; these theories tend to be  "observationally  equivalent."  At the
same time,  however,  this  makes  our  choice  here of an  explicit  formulation
based  on the wage-productivity  link  less restrictive  than it  appears  at  first
glance;  in  fact,  a wage-setting  equation  fundamentally  similar  to  (28)  can
also be derived by considering,  say,  turnover  costs.  A bargaining  framework
between  firms  and  a  centralized  trade  union  could  also  lead  to  a similar
wage-setting  specification.  The  important  point  is  to assume  in each  case
that whereas  firms  are  concerned  with  the product wage,  workers  (or  the
union that represents them)  are concerned  with the consumption wage.  This
18As  noted  earlier,  skilled  employment  in  the public  sector  is set exogenously  by the
government.
26creates  a wedge  (as derived above) through which relative prices  affect wage-
setting decisions.
Although  our  treatment  above provides  a tractable  specification  of the
wage-productivity  link,  a more  general  specification  of wage formation  for
skilled labor may also be warranted in some applications.  Such a specification
is  also available  in IMMPA  and consists  of replacing  (28)  by the  "generic"
formulation
WS  =  WS(PINDs  )inds(UNEMPs)-OuQ1 (p  )  )2 (1 + IL_ 1)  3, (31)
where  PINDs = PLEV or PT2 (depending on whether the nominal wage
is indexed  to the overall  level  of prices  or the  composite  "product"  price),
0 < inds < 1, and Qw, ￿u,  Xl,  02,  )3 >  0.
If this specification  is used, ws in equation (27) must be defined as ws =
WS/PT2,  with  Ws given  in  (31),  and  the production  technology,  equation
(10), must be replaced  by
Vp = CES{CES[CES(Sp, Kp), Up], KG}.  (32)
Specification  (31)  is  quite flexible;  for  instance,  full  indexation  on  the
consumer price index only requires setting PINDs = PLEV, inds =  1, and
OU =  01  =  02 =  03 =  0.  To  assume that the product  wage  depends  only
on the ratio PUs/PT 2 (as  above)  requires setting PINDs = PT2,  inds = 1,
02 >  0,  and  ￿u  = 4l  =  03 =  0.  Note  also that in  (31),  as  long  as 4 u  >  0,
the level of skilled unemployment  will affect  (negatively)  the level of nominal
wages,  instead of the rate of growth of wages  (as would be the case  with a
Phillips curve formulation).  This level effect  is consistent with various forms
of efficiency wage theories in which unemployment  acts as a "worker discipline
device,"  such  as the effort  elicitation model  of Shapiro and  Stiglitz  (1984);
evidence supporting it has been provided for instance by Hoddinot  (1996)  for
Cote d'Ivoire.  Finally,  note that the gross lending  rate,  1 +  IL_1 ,  enters in
this specification  because, say,  an increase in the cost of borrowing raises the
effective price of labor, which firms try to offset, at least in part, by reducing
the nominal wage.  If O3 <  1 (03>  1) the net effect is an increase (reduction)
in the effective cost of skilled labor, and the demand for skilled labor will fall
(increase).  The  wage equation  (31)  is used  by Ag6nor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,
and van der Mensbrugghe  (2003)  in their IMMPA framework  for Brazil.
Note that the inverse relationship  between the level of skilled unemploy-
ment  and the skilled workers'  wage can also be introduced  in either  (26)  or
27(28), by assuming that the reservation wage,  Qw,  is inversely related to the
unemployment  rate:
Qw =  Qw(UNEMPs)-u,
where qu > 0.  Put differently,  unemployment  acts as a  "disciplining device"
by reducing the  perceived  opportunity  cost  of working  and/or  in reducing
wage  demands.  In the simulation  experiments  reported  below,  however,  we
focus on the case where qu = 0.
3.3  Supply and Demand
As noted earlier,  we assume that both the informal  and public  sector goods
are nontraded.  This therefore  implies  that,  in  each  sector,  total  supply  is
equal to gross production, that is,
XI = Q,,  XG= QG  (33)
Agricultural  and private  formal urban  goods,  by contrast, compete  with
imported  goods.  The supply of the composite good for each  of these sectors
consists  of a CES combination  of imports and domestically-produced  goods:
QAN  =  CES(MAN,DAN),  (34)
Q=  CES(Mp, Dp),  (35)
where DAN = XAN-
Aggregate  demand for each  of these sectors consists  of intermediate  and
final  consumption,  government  spending,  and investment  demand:
QAN  =  CAN +  INTAN,  (36)
I = C, + INTI,  (37)
Q  =  CG +  ZG +  INTG,  (38)
QP =  Cp  + Gp  +  Zp  + INTp,  (39)
where INTj  (for j  = AN, I, G, P)  is defined  as total demand  (by all produc-
tions sectors)  for intermediate  consumption  of good j:
INTj =  E  ajiXi  for i =  AN, AT, I, P, G.  (40)
i
28Government  expenditure on good j,  Gj, is expressed  in real terms  as:
Gj =  G  for j=p,  AN, G,  (41) -ggj j5Q
where G represents total nominal government expenditure,  PQh  is the market
price of goods purchased by the government,  and 99AN+  99G +99P =  1. Note
that the government  is assumed  not to spend on informal sector  goods.
For the nontraded  agricultural  and informal  sectors,  aggregate  demand
(QAN  and  QI)  consists  of intermediate  consumption  and  demand  for final
consumption  (CAN and Cl), whereas aggregate  demand for the public good,
QG, consists  of intermediate  consumption  as  well  as  demand  for  final  con-
sumption, CG, and investment demand,  ZG.  Aggregate demand of the private
formal good, Qp,  is taken to consist  of intermediate consumption  as  well  as
demand  for  final  private  consumption,  Cp,  final government  consumption,
Gp, and private investment,  Zp.
Final  consumption  for  each  production  sector  i,  Ci,  is  the  summation
across all categories of households of nominal consumption of good i, deflated
by the demand price of good i:
Ci  Cih  =  EhCh cc-h  CONh  where 0 < ccih  <1,  E  i  1
h  ~~~PQ,  CCi  =  1(2
where  Cih is  consumption  of good  i  by household  h  and  PQi  is the  com-
posite  sales  price  of good i  (defined  below).  Coefficients  ccih  indicate  how
total nominal consumption by household  h, CONh, is allocated to each type
of good.  Equations  (42)  can  be derived  by  maximization  of a Stone-Geary
utility function  (see for instance Deaton  and Muellbauer  (1980)).  They rep-
resent  a  linear  expenditure  system  in  which,  for  simplicity,  the subsistence
level of consumption  is set to zero.
Finally,  aggregate  investment made by firms, Z,  consists of purchases  of
both public  and private  goods and services  (ZG and  Zp respectively):
Z*PK
Z, =  ZZ,  PQ  ,  where ZZG  +  ZZP.
Coefficients  zzi  measure  the  allocation  of total  investment  demand  to
public and private  goods.
293.4  External  lrade
As indicated  earlier,  firms  in the private formal  sector  allocate their output
to exports  or the  domestic  market  according  to the  production  possibility
frontier  (PPF)  specified  in  equation  (11)  and the  relative  price  of exports
(PEp) vis-a-vis  domestic  goods  (PDp).  Efficiency  conditions  require  that
firms  equate this relative  price to the opportunity  cost in production.  This
yields:
( PEp  __-__T
EP = DP (PDP.  1 -T  )  (43)
The agricultural  traded  good is  fully exported,  as  also indicated  earlier;
given that this sector is the only one using only its own good as intermediate
consumption,  we have
EAT  =  VAT  =  (1 -aAT,AT)XAT-  (44)
A similar  reasoning  applies  to the determination  of the  demand  for im-
ports.  We assume that imports compete with domestic goods in the agricul-
tural nontraded sector as well as in the private  formal sector.  Making  use of
Armington  functions  for the demand  for imported  vs.  domestic goods  and
relative prices, import demand  for both sectors  (MA  and MP) can be written
as:
MAN  =DAN  (PDAN  /
3 QA  O-QA
MAN  =  DAN (PMAN  1 -f3QA)  (45)
MP  =  DP (PDp  /QP  )  QP
Mp  p (PMP  1 - /3 QP )(46)
These  equations  indicate  that the  ratio of imports  to  domestic  supply
of both categories  of domestic goods  depends on the relative  prices of these
goods and the elasticity of substitution,  UQA  and oQp,  between these goods.
3.5  Prices
As  we  have  seen previously  production  requires  both factor  inputs  and in-
termediate inputs;  we therefore  define the net or value added price of output
as:
PVi ==  - PXj(1-indtaxi)-  ajiPQj  Xi,  where  i, j = AN, AT, I, P,  G
(47)
30where  indtaxi is  the  rate  of indirect  taxation  of output  in sector  i  (with
indtax, =  0  because there is no indirect taxation of informal sector output).
This equation relates the value added price of output of sector i to the price of
gross output, PXi, net of indirect taxes,  less the cost of intermediate inputs
(purchased  at composite prices).
We are considering  a small economy  and therefore assume that the world
prices of imported and exported goods  are exogenously  given.  The domestic
currency price of these goods is obtained by adjusting the world price by the
exchange rate,  the import  tariff rate, tm, or the export subsidy rate,  te:
PE, = wpei(l + tei)ER,  for i = AT, P,  (48)
PMi = wpmi(1  +  tmi)ER,  for i = AN, P.  (49)
Because the transformation  function between exports and domestic sales
of the  urban private  good  is  linear  homogeneous,  the  sales price,  PXp, is
derived  from the expenditure identity:'9
PXPXP = PDPDP  + PEPEP,
that is,20
=  PDPDP  + PEPEP  (50)
XP
For the  informal  and  public  sectors  (both  of which produce  goods that
are  not  exported  and  do  not  compete  with  imports),  the  composite  sales
price  is  identical  to the  price  of domestic  sales,  which  in turn  is  equal  to
the price  of gross  output.  In the  agricultural  sector,  the sales  price  of the
traded  agricultural  good,  PXAT,  is  simply  the  domestic-currency  price  of
19An  alternative  approach  to price  formation  in the private  formal sector is to assume
that prices are set monopolistically,  as markups over input costs (as  for instance in Yeldan
(1997),  among others).  With a fixed markup, equilibrium would then require the level of
output to be demand determined, implying that the production function would be dropped
from the system.
201n  solving the model, we use equation  (46)  to solve for PDp, and, because  QSp  =  Qd
we use  (39)  to solve for  the equilibrium  value of Qp.  We then invert the composite good
CES  equation  (35)  to solve  for Mp  and  invert  the  CET function  (11)  to solve for  Dp.
This procedure ensures that the composite price (and thus indirectly  the price of domestic
sales)  adjusts  to equilibrate supply and  demand.
31agricultural  exports,  PEAT,  whereas  the sales price of the nontraded  good,
PXAN,  is equal to the domestic price of agricultural  goods,  PDAN.
For the nontraded agricultural sector  and private urban  production,  the
substitution  function  between  imports  and  domestic  goods  is  also linearly
homogeneous,  and the market price is determined  accordingly by the expen-
diture identity:
PQiQi = PDiDi  +  PMiMi, for i = AN, P,
that is
PDiDi  +  PM1Mi
PDQDi  =  P  ,  for i  =  AN, P.  (51)
Qi
For those sectors that do not compete with imports  (informal and public
sector  goods),  the domestic price,  PDi, is simply equal to the market  price,
PXi:
PDi = PXi, for i = I,  G.  (52)
The nested CES production function of private formal urban goods is also
linearly homogeneous;  prices of the composite inputs are therefore derived in
similar  fashion:
T1PT1 = T2PT2 +  (1 +  IL-1)WMUP,  (53)
T2PT2 PROFP  +  (1 + IL-1)WsSp,  (54)
where PROFp, as defined below, denotes profits of private firms in the urban
formal  sector.
The price of capital  is constructed  as using the investment  expenditure
identity,  which  involves  those goods  for which  there is  investment  demand,
namely,  the public good  and private-formal  urban  good  (see  equations  (38)
and (39)):
PK = Ei PQiZi  PQGZG + PQPZP  (55)
z  z
Markets  for informal goods  and  government  services  clear  continuously;
equilibrium conditions  are thus given by
QS  =  Qd  QS  =  Qd
32In solving the model,  we use equations  (33)  to determine the equilibrium
quantities Q,  and QG, that is, equations  (5)  and (7).  We also use the demand
equations  (37) and  (38) to solve residually  for C, and CG, that is:
XI-G,-INT, = Cl,  (56)
XG-GG-ZG-INTG = CG.  (57)
Equation  (42)  for  i = I, G, is then  solved for PQ, = PX, and PQG
PXG, respectively.  This yields:
PX  Eh  CCihCONh  i  =I,  G.  (58)
ci
The  aggregate  price level,  PLEV, or consumer  price index (CPI), is  a
weighted  average  of individual goods  market  prices,  PQi:
PLEV = CPI =  E  wtiPQi,  (59)
where  0  <  wti  <  1 denotes the relative  weight  of good  i in the index,  and
PQ1 = PD1 and  PQG =  PDG.  These  weights  are  fixed  according  to the
share  of each  of these  goods  in  aggregate  consumption  in the  base  period.
Inflation  is defined  as the  percentage  change in the price  level:
PLEV - PLEV-1 (60)
PLEV- 1
Finally, the consumption  price index for the rural sector  is given by
PR =  wriPQi,  (61)
whereas the consumption price indexes  for urban unskilled and skilled work-
ers are given by
Puu =  EwuiPQi,  (62)
Pus =  wsiPQi,  (63)
where the  wri,  wui  and  wsi are relative  weights  with Ei wr,  Ei wui  and
Ei wsi summing to unity.  The deflator of GDP at factor cost  (used below),
is given by
33PGDPFC  = EiviPVi,  v1 _  PViXi/E3PV7X,  (64)
where,  again, Eivi  1.
3.6  Profits and Income
Firms'  profits are  defined  as revenue minus total labor costs.  In the case  of
agricultural  nontraded  sector firms  and urban  informal  sector firms,  profits
are simply given  by
PROF, = PViV - WA,  for i = AN, I.  (65)
Firms  producing  in the traded agricultural  sector  must include  working
capital  costs  as  well  in  measuring  their  production  costs,  that  is,  interest
payments  on their wage  bill;  their profits  are therefore  given by
PROFAT =  PVATVAT  - (1  +  IL_1)WATUAT.  (66)
Finally,  profits  of private-urban  sector  firms  account  for  both  working
capital  costs and salaries  paid to both categories  of workers:
PROFP = PVpVp  - (1 + IL-)UpWM - (1 + IL- 1)SpWs,  (67)
where,  as noted  earlier,  the  nominal  wage  paid to unskilled  workers  is the
legally-imposed  minimum wage,  WM.
Firms' income is simply equal to profits minus interest payments on loans
for  investment  purposes.  Firms'  income  and  profits  are  defined  separately,
because not all sectors are assumed to borrow on the credit market to finance
investment.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  only  firms  in the  formal  urban
economy  accumulate  capital.21 Firms' income can thus be defined as:
YF, = PROFi, for i = AN, AT, I,  (68)
YFP = PROFP  - IL 1 DLP,- 1 - IF * FLP,_ 1ER,  (69)
where IF  is the interest rate paid on foreign loans, and DLP and FLP are the
levels borrowed  domestically  and abroad by private urban firms for physical
capital accumulation.
21f course,  this assumption can  be relaxed  in specific  country applications.
34Commercial  banks'  profits  must  also be  taken into  account.  They  are
defined as the difference between revenues from loans to firms (be it for work-
ing capital or  investment  needs)  and interest payments  on both households'
deposits,  Eh DDh, and  foreign loans  received  from international  creditors,
FLB:
YFPB  =  IL- 1[DLp,-1 +  DLG, 1 +  UATWAT  +  WMUP +  WSSP]  (70)
-ID  E  DDh,.l  - IF.  ER. FLB,_ 1,
h
where  ID  is  the interest  rate  on bank  deposits,  assumed  to  be set  by the
central  bank.
Household  income  is  based on salaried  labor,  distributed  profits,  trans-
fers,  and net  interest  receipts  on holdings  of financial  assets.  Households
are  defined according  to both labor  categories  and  their sector  of location.
There  are two types  of rural households:  one comprising  workers  employed
in  the  traded  sector,  and  the  other  workers  in  the  nontraded  sector.  In
the urban sector there  are two types of unskilled  households,  those working
in the informal  sector  and  those  employed  in the  formal  sector.  The fifth
type of households  consists of skilled workers  employed  in the formal urban
economy (in both the private and public sectors).  Finally, there are "capital-
ist"  households  (including rentiers) whose income comes from firms' earnings
in the formal private  sector,  the agricultural  traded  sector and  commercial
banks.  We further assume that households in both the nontraded agricultural
sector and in the informal  urban economy  own the firms in which they  are
employed-an  assumption that captures the fact that firms in these sectors
tend indeed to be small,  family-owned  enterprises.
Income of agricultural nontraded and urban informal groups is given by
YHi =  iTRH + WA  + ID  DDj,_  + IF  FDi,-ER  + YFi,  for i =  AN, I,
(71)
where  yj  is the portion of total government transfers  (TRH) each group re-
ceives, Wii denote wage earnings,  DDi domestic bank deposits, FDi  foreign
bank deposits  (taken to be  a fairly  small share of assets in the simulations
reported  below),  and YFi firms'  income in these sectors.
Income  of the  agricultural  traded  sector  household,  as  well  as  that  of
the urban  formal  unskilled  and skilled  households,  depends  on government
transfers, salaries and interests on deposits; firms provide no source of income,
35because  these  groups  do  not  own  the  production  units  in  which  they  are
employed:
YH,  =  -yiTRH+WiU 1 +ID.DDi,1±+IF*FDi,_ 1 ER,  for i = AT, UF,  (72)
YHs =  ySTRH  +  Ws(Sp +  SG) +  ID-  DDs,- 1 +  IF  FDS,_ 1ER,  (73)
where  UUF = UP +  UG.
Firms' income in the traded agricultural  and private urban sectors are as-
sumed to  go to capitalist  households,  along  with commercial  bank's  income,
and  interest  on  deposits.  Because  there  is no  capital  accumulation  in the
traded  agricultural sector to be financed,  the entire  amount of firms'  profits
from that sector  are transferred  to capitalist  households.  By contrast,  firms
in the private urban sector  retain a portion of their earnings, re, for invest-
ment financing purposes,  and transfer the remainder to capitalist households.
Capitalist households'  income  is thus:
YHKAP  =  ID  .DDKAP,-1 +  IF  FDKAP,-1ER + YFAT  (74)
+(1-  re)YFp +  YFPB +  ^yKApTRH.
3.7  Savings,  consumption,  and Investment
Each  category  of  household  h  saves  a  fraction,  0  <  savrateh  <  1,  of its
disposable  income:
SAVh  = savratehYHh(l - inctaXh),  (75)
where 0 < inctaxh <  1 is the income tax rate applicable to household  h.
The savings rate is a positive function of the real interest rate on deposits:
I1±ID  USh  (6
savrateh = 80,h  (  + PINF)  (76)
Note that in practical  applications  the propensity to save  can be made  a
function of not  only the real deposit  rate,  which  implies that inflation  and
the savings rate are  inversely related,  but also of the inflation rate itself,  as
a result  of a  precautionary  motive  (with higher  inflation  acting  as a signal
of greater uncertainty about future real income).  The evidence  on the latter
effect  is  significant  (see  Agenor  (2000)  and  Loayza,  Schmidt-Hebbel,  and
Serven  (1999))  and may be highly relevant  for some countries.
36The  portion of disposable  income  that is not  saved is  allocated  to con-
sumption:2 2
CONh =  (1-  inctaXh)YHh  - SAVh.
Finally,  the total flow of savings  of each household  is channeled  into the
accumulation of financial wealth,  WTh, which also accounts  for valuation ef-
fects on the stock of foreign-currency  deposits,  FDh, associated with changes
in the nominal exchange rate,  ER:
WTh = WTh,_1 +  SAVh  + AER- FDh,1l.
Capital  accumulation  occurs  only  in the  private  urban  sector.  The de-
cision  to  invest  is  assumed  to  depend  on  several  factors.  First,  there  is  a
positive  effect  of the after-tax  rate of return to  capital  relative  to the  cost
of funds.  Second,  there  is  an  accelerator  effect,  which  aims  to capture the
impact  of the desired  capital stock  on  current  investment.  Third,  there  is
a  negative  effect  of the  (lagged)  inflation  rate,  which  may  be  viewed  as  a
measure  of macroeconomic  instability.  Fourth,  there  is  a positive  effect  of
the public capital stock in infrastructure-cumulated  investment in railroads,
paved roads,  water systems, telecommunications,  and power-a relationship
for  which  there  is  also  robust  evidence  (see  Agenor  and  Montiel  (1999)).
Finally, there is a negative  effect of the economy's level  of debt,  which may
result from several possible factors:  a) the risk of confiscation associated with
a debt overhang  (as discussed earlier);  b) the diversion of foreign exchange to
service foreign debt and consequently insufficient amounts of foreign currency
to import capital goods; and c) the possibility that a high external debt may
force a reallocation of public expenditure away from productive  uses (mainte-
nance and infrastructure investment,  most notably)  and toward debt service.
In the second case the inclusion  of foreign debt acts as a  "proxy"  for foreign
exchange  availability,  whereas  in the third it is a proxy for  the composition
of public spending.23
22Note  that we  do  not account  for any  real  balances  effect  (or wealth  effect)  on con-
sumption,  as  in Easterly  (1990)  and  others.  This  effect can  be,  however,  easily  added  if
warranted by the empirical evidence-for instance by making the savings rate a function of
wealth  as well.  It could  prove important in assessing  the effects of exchange-rate  induced
valuation  changes on domestic  expenditure.
23jt should be noted that the disincentive effects of external debt may be related not only
to  private  investment  but also  to international  capital flows.  As  discussed  by Khan  and
Haque (1985),  high public external debt can lead to capital flight if domestic investment is
37Specifically,  we  model  the investment  function  by  firms  in the private
urban sector  as
Z  (KINF  )  {(1 +  AURGDPFC )ACC  (77)
Kp,_,  KINF,-1  RGDPFC,-l
z  _  _  ((1  +  IK)  (1 - inctaXKAP)  IK
(1 + PINF_,)-p  1 +  IL
KIFG * ER.*  FLG,-l0  IFG * ER * FLG,-l0  2
-OD  (F  )VREV  )  |PDD  (IFG  R2
The  analytical  form  adopted  for  the  investment  function  incorporates
some  key  features  for the  analysis  of debt  reduction  strategies.  Equation
(77)  indicates  that the ratio of investment,  Z, to the  (lagged)  stock  of pri-
vate capital,  KP, is  positively  related  to the return  to capital,  IK,  net  of
the  income  tax rate  that  capitalists  are  subject  to.  This  term  introduces
an adverse  effect  of higher  taxes  on investment.  The negative  effect  of the
lending  rate  represents  the  cost  of borrowing  to finance  capital  accumula-
tion.  High inflation  also has  a negative  effect  on investment  decisions;  this
variable  captures  the impact  of increased  uncertainty  about  relative  prices
under  higher  inflation,  which  makes  investment  decisions  riskier.  Several
recent studies-see,  for instance,  Serven  (1997,  1998)  and  Zeufack  (1997)--
have  indeed  shown that  macroeconomic  instability  may  have  a significant
detrimental effect  on the decision to invest, particularly when capital outlays
are irreversible.  There is also substantial  empirical evidence that public and
private  sector  capital in infrastructure  tend to be complements  (see  Agenor
and Montiel  (1999)).  This  is  accounted  for  by the  addition  of the  growth
rate of the public capital  stock in infrastructure  (KINF)  in determining  the
growth rate of private  capital.
Second,  equation  (77)  integrates the  "flexible"  accelerator  effect  on pri-
vate investment.  The ability of the firm to respond to changes  in its desired
capital stock is reflected  in the positive effect on investment  of the growth in
value  added, which is measured by changes  in real GDP evaluated  at factor
cost,  RGDPFC, defined as
subject to "expropriation risk."  Conversely,  debt reduction may not only stimulate private
domestic  capital  formation  but  also net  capital  inflows;  see  for  instance,  Bhattacharya,
Montiel and Sharma  (1997)  for sub-Saharan Africa.  This may  be an important  source of
positive  externality  associated  with debt  relief,  which  suggests  that the  benefits  of this
shock,  as discussed below,  may be under-estimated.
38RGDPFC = EiPViXiIPGDPFc,  (78)
where PGDPFC,  the deflator of GDP at factor cost, is  defined in  (64).
There is considerable  evidence supporting this effect, particularly for sub-
Saharan  Africa,  as  discussed  for instance  by Ag6nor  (2000,  Chapter  1).  Fi-
nally, the last two terms in equation (77) indicate that investment is inversely
related to the ratio  of interest  payments  on public sector  debt to tax  rev-
enues.  This  ratio may capture  various  factors  (as  noted  above),  including
the existence  of confiscation  risk.  For instance,  when government  revenues
fall,  investors may infer that there is a higher probability that private sector
capital may be either taxed or confiscated to finance existing debt service.
This  particular  form  of the  investment  function  introduces  a key  role
for fiscal  policy.  For  instance,  increasing income  tax rates will increase  tax
collection  and therefore  result  in  a positive  effect  by  reducing  confiscation
risk;  but  at  the  same  time it  will  also  reduce  the  net  return  to  physical
capital.  A debt reduction program combined with suitable fiscal policies may
both reduce interest payments and improve tax collection,  thereby reducing
confiscation  risk and  boosting  private  investment.  The specific  formulation
that we have adopted  here  (which includes  both linear  and quadratic  terms
in the debt service-to-taxes  ratio) implies that the marginal effect  on private
investment  of a  reduction  in the debt  ratio  is  magnified  if the initial  level
of that  ratio  is  high.  We  could  also  have  assumed  that the  relationship
between  investment  and external  debt  has a concave  form,  as suggested  by
the econometric results of Elbadawi, Ndulu, and Ndungu (1997); in that case,
the coefficient  OD should be negative, implying that external debt has at first
a positive  impact  and  a negative  one  only  when  the it becomes  relatively
large.
The rate of return on capital is defined as the ratio of profits to the stock
of capital:
IK= PROFp  (79)
PK~  (79)
Capital accumulation depends on the flow level of investment,  Z, and the
depreciation rate of capital from the previous period,  Sp:
Kp = Kp,-  (1 - p) +  Z-1,  (80)
where 0 < 6p < 1.
393.8  Financial Sector
The financial balance sheets of each group of agents are presented in summary
form in  Table  1.  In what  follows  we consider  in turn the  determination  of
the portfolio structure  of households,  the  demand  for  credit  by firms,  and
the behavior  of commercial  banks.
3.8.1  Households
In contrast  to  various  FCGE  models  that  assume  that  existing  stocks  of
assets  cannot be traded,  and only  additional flows  from savings  can be al-
located  to existing  assets,  we  assume  here that  agents  can freely  alter  the
desired composition  of their stock of financial wealth-subject  to the overall
constraint that initial or beginning-of-period  wealth is predetermined  at any
given moment in time.  Each category of households allocates instantaneously
its stock of wealth to either money (in the form of cash holdings that bear no
interest),  Hh,  domestic bank deposits,  DDh, or foreign  bank deposits,  FDh
(see Figure 3):
WTh  = Hh + ER  FDh +  DDh.  (81)
Note that  in our  definition of private wealth  we have excluded  land and
other  types  of real  assets  (such  as  livestock),  which  can  be  important  for
households  located in the rural sector.  Some of these assets  are often held in
"unproductive"  form and  no market per se exists to  measure their relative
price.  Thus,  in practice,  accounting  for  real  assets  is  likely  to raise  some
insurmountable measurement problems, involving both values and quantities.
Nevertheless,  it should be kept in mind that in a setting in which such assets
are accounted  for,  a reallocation of wealth away  from  (say) real to financial
assets  would  have  significant  real  effects,  by  affecting  interest  income  on
interest-bearing  assets  (such as bank deposits),  disposable income,  and thus
expenditure.
Real money  demand  functions  for  each household  category  are taken to
depend  positively  on  real  income  (measured  in  terms  of the  overall  price
level, which is nothing but the inverse of the purchasing power of one unit of
currency),  and negatively  on inflation  (as  a proxy  for the opportunity  cost
of holding money  instead of real assets)  and the rates of return on domestic
and foreign deposits  (which measure the opportunity  cost of holding money
40instead of interest-bearing  financial  assets):
Hd  PLEV (PLEV)  (1  +  ID)-hD[(1  + IF)(1 +  dev)]jPhF .(82)
(1 + PINF)  -PPINF,
where  dev denotes  the expected  devaluation  rate,  that is, the expected  rate
of change  in  ER,  which  is  taken  as  exogenous.  This  specification  of the
money demand function allows us not only to account for different elasticities
between domestic and foreign deposits, but also for different elasticities across
households.
An  alternative,  simpler  specification  is to  assume  that  the  demand  for
money balances  is proportional to total consumption,  as a result  of a  "cash-
in-advance"  constraint:
Hh =  CONSh.
Because  of our assumptions of a fixed exchange rate and incomplete ster-
ilization,  the nominal  money  supply  (which  is derived  below  from  the base
money stock),  HI,  is determined  endogenously.  In equilibrium,  this stock  is
equal to the total sum of money demanded  by households:24
Hs=EHg.  (83)
h
The portion of wealth that is not held in the form of noninterest-bearing
currency  is  allocated  between  domestic  and foreign  deposits.  The relative
proportions  of holdings of each of these two categories of assets are taken to
depend on their relative rates of return:
'fBh  1±+ID  aBh
1 -YBh  (  ( 1 +  IF)  (1 + dev)  (84)
where  'YBh  represents  the proportion  of domestic  deposits  held in total de-
posits:
7Bh  ~  DDh  (85)
=Bh=DDh+ER *FDh(
24When  computing the solution of our model,  this equation is dropped.  Given Walras'
law, if all other markets but the money market are in equilibrium, then the money market
must be in equilibrium  as well.  Our  computer  program checks  that this equation  indeed
holds continuously.
41In  solving  the  model,  we  use  equation  (84)  to  determine  the  optimal
level  of domestic bank  deposits, whereas  we  use equation  (81)  to determine
residually the level of foreign  deposits.
3.8.2  Firms
Firms  finance  their  investment  plans  (as  defined  above)  through  retained
earnings  and domestic  (DLp)  and foreign (FLp) loans:
PK - Z = ADLp + ER -AFLp + re * YFp.
Solving this equation for DLp gives us the demand for bank loans:
DLd  = DLp,_ 1- ER .AFLp + PK * Z-re  -YFp.  (86)
The path of foreign loans  is set exogenously.  This implicitly  accounts  for
ceilings  that firms may  face in their access  to foreign markets.
3.8.3  Commercial  Banks
Banks  are  at the heart  of the  financial  system  in our  archetype  economy,
as is  indeed the case  in many  low- and  middle-income developing  countries.
Commercial  banks  in  our  framework  are  required  to  keep  a  portion  0  <
rreq < 1 of the deposits that they collect  as reserve  requirements:
RR = rreq  E  DDh.  (87)
h
The balance sheet of commercial  banks is
NWPB  = DLP  +  DLG +  RR-Z  DDh- ER  FLB,  (88)
h
where  NWPB  denotes  banks'  net  worth,  DLP  loans  to  the private  sector,
DLG  loans  to the  government,  and ER * FLB  foreign  loans  (measured  in
domestic  currency terms).
Equation (86)  represents the demand for loans.  We assume that the actual
stock of loans is demand determined,  and that banks borrow on world capital
markets the required  "shortfall"  given their  domestic sources  of funds.  The
42commercial banks'  balance sheet is thus used to determine FLB (see Figure
4): 25
ER * AFLB = ADLp +  LXDLG  - (1-  rreq) E  ADDh.  (89)
h
Given (89),  and given that all their profits are distributed to households,
the net worth of commercial  banks  evolves over time  according to,
NWPB =  NWPB,-1  - AER.  FLB,- 1 ,  (90)
where  the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  represents  again  valuation
effects  associated with nominal exchange rate changes.
Banks  set  the  loan  interest  rate  as  a  premium  over  the  average  cost
of funds-including  the devaluation  rate,  which  affects  the  cost  of foreign
borrowing-taking into account the (implicit) cost of holding reserve require-
ments:
IL  = PR ID' b[(1 +  IF)  (1 +  dev)  - 1]1-Qb  (91)
1 -rreq
where  0  <  ab  <  1  is  measured  by the  initial share  of domestic  deposits  in
banks'  total funds  (that  is,  Ceb  = Eh DDh,o/(Eh  DDh,O +  FLB,oERo)), and
PR denotes the finance premium,  which  is assumed to be set according to:
PR  S  [=  (&c(NWp+DLP  ))  +  (1 - 6,)PR_ 1,  (92)
where  0 <  p,  < 1 is the speed of adjustment,  0  < 6,  <  1, and NWp  is the
net worth of private urban firms in nominal terms,  defined  as
NWp = PK  Kp-DLp-ER  FLp.
NWp  changes  over time according  to
NWp  =  NWp,-1 + PK  AKp - ADLp - ER  AFLp  - AER.  FL,9.3)
+APK- Kp,l.
The  last  two terms  on  the right-hand  side  of this  expression  represent
capital losses associated with depreciations  of the nominal exchange rate and
capital gains associated  with changes in the price of capital.
25Note that capital losses associated with nominal exchange rate changes, AER*FLB, 1I,
axe accounted  for in equation  (70).
43Our  specification  of pricing  decisions  by  commercial  banks  allows  us to
capture balance sheet effects in the determination  of loan rates.  It is consis-
tent with the current  line of research emphasizing  the role of collateral  and
the impact of borrowers'  net worth on the  "finance premium,"  as illustrated
in the work of Bernanke,  Gertler, and Gilchrist  (2000),  Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997),  and Izquierdo  (2000).  The  higher the  value  of the  private  capital
stock  net  of foreign  borrowing  (that  is,  "pledgeable"  collateral,  PK * Kp
-ER- FLP, or  an  "effective"  fraction  6,  of that  amount)  relative to the
amount  of domestic loans,  DLP, the higher the proportion  of total lending
that banks can  recoup  in the event  of default  by seizing  borrowers'  assets.
This  reduces  the  finance  premium  and  the  cost  of borrowing,  stimulating
the demand for  credit.  The  dependence  of the  cost  of funds  on  net worth
is a critical  aspect  of the model;  for instance,  a nominal  exchange  rate de-
valuation  (a rise in ER), reduces  firms'  net worth  and may dampen private
investment  by increasing the cost  of capital.
An  alternative  justification  for  the  finance  premium  equation  (92)  can
be  found  in the  models  of credit  market  imperfections  recently  developed
by Agenor  and Aizenrnan  (1998,  1999b).  These models,  following  Townsend
(1979) and Helpman (1989),  emphasize the importance of monitoring and en-
forcement costs of loan contracts that lenders face in a weak legal environment-
as is so often the case in developing countries.  In such an environment,  these
costs may be an increasing  function of the amount lent (even against  "good"
collateral)  because  of congestion  in courts  and the difficulty  of settling legal
claims, which make it hard for  lenders to actually seize borrowers'  assets  in
case of default.  This approach amounts to specifying the premium  as a pos-
itive function of the ratio of the amount lent DLP over  "effective"  collateral
(as is done here)  or separately as a negative function of PK  KP- ER  * FLP,
with possibly a lower elasticity than that associated with DLP.
Finally,  it should be noted that the assumption that banks borrow at will
on world capital  markets to satisfy the demand for domestic loans  may not
be appropriate for all low-income  countries, because domestic financial inter-
mediaries  (even local subsidiaries  of foreign banks)  may  have either limited
access to these markets-and thus be subject to quantity rationing-or may
face themselves a rising risk premium on external funds  (as,  for instance,  in
Agenor  and Aizenman  (1998)).  An  alternative  approach,  which  avoids  in-
troducing credit rationing of domestic borrowers  and its complications,  is to
assume that commercial  banks  hold  excess  liquid reserves  (above  and  over
required reserves),  and that movements in such reserves adjust endogenously
44to equilibrate the credit market-with  foreign borrowing taken as exogenous.
3.9  Public Sector
The public sector in our framework consists of the government and the central
bank.  We consider them in turn and relate changes  in official  reserves to the
balance of payments.
3.9.1  Central Bank and the Balance  of Payments
From the central  bank's balance sheet, its net worth,  NWCB,  is given by
NWCB = DCG + ER  FF-MB,  (94)
where  DCG denotes  domestic  credit  to the  government,  FF the  stock  of
foreign  reserves,  and  MB the monetary  base.  Assuming that capital  gains
and  losses  are not  monetized,  changes  in the monetary base reflect  changes
in credit  to the government,  as well  as changes  in official reserves:
MB = MB-1 +  ADCG + ER  /AFF.  (95)
Assuming no operating  costs,  net profits  of the central  bank,  PROFCB,
are given by the sum of interest  payments on loans to the government,  and
interest receipts on holdings of foreign  assets:
PROFCB = IL- 1 DCG,_ 1 +  IFG  FF- 1 . (96)
where IFG is the interest rate on foreign loans to the government.  We assume
that net profits of the central bank are transferred to the government.
Whereas  domestic  credit  to the  government,  DCG, is  treated  as an ex-
ogenous policy variable,  the accumulation of foreign  reserves depends on the
balance of payments  (see Figure 5), as any current account surplus (or deficit)
must be compensated  by a net flow of foreign capital:
AFF  E(wpeiEj - wpmiMi) +  IF  3  E  FDh,_1  (97)
i  h
-IF  FLP,-1-IFG(FLG,l  - FF- 1)  - IF-  FLB,-1
-ZAFDh+  AFLG+AFLp +AFLB.
h
45Equation (97)  determines, the change in the foreign-currency value of offi-
cial reserves, AFF, required to clear the balance  of payments,  given changes
in households'  holdings of foreign assets, Eh AFDh, changes in foreign loans
made to the government, AFLG, and to private firms, AFLp (both taken to
be exogenous),  changes in loans to domestic banks, AFLB, and the current
account.
The  monetary  base  consists  of currency,  H8,  and reserve  requirements,
RR.  The supply of currency to households  is thus given by
H8 = MB - RR.  (98)
Note that the model can also be solved with a flexible exchange  rate (as
opposed  to  a fixed  exchange  rate),  in  which  case FF would  be  kept  con-
stant  (that is, AFF = 0)  and equation  (97)  would be solved for the nominal
exchange  rate  (which  affects  trade volumes).  Under  this regime,  currency
fluctuations  can have sizable  effects not only on the banking system but also
on private sector balance sheets and the functioning  of the economy;  as dis-
cussed earlier,  the  "finance premium"  depends not only on the capital stock
but more generally on the net worth of private borrowers,  which accounts  for
foreign borrowing.
Finally,  given  (94)  and  (95),  the  central  bank's  net worth  evolves  over
time  according to:
NWCB  =  NWCB,-1 + LER  FF_1,  (99)
where the last term represents valuation effects.
3.9.2  Government
We  assume that  government  expenditures  consist  of government  consump-
tion,  which  only has  demand-side  effects,  and public investment,  which  has
both demand-  and  supply-side effects.  Public  investment  consists  of invest-
ment  in  infrastructure,  education,  and  health.26 We  define  investment  in
infrastructure  as the  expenditure  affecting  the accumulation  of public  in-
frastructure capital,  which includes public assets such as roads, power plants
and railroads.  Investment in education  affects  the stock of public education
261t  should  be  noted  that  this  treatment  of  public  investment  differs  from  standard
data classification reported  in national accounts;  in many instances  these investments  are
classified  as current expenditures.
46capital, which consists of assets such as school buildings and other infrastruc-
ture affecting  skills acquisition,  but  does not  represent human  capital.  In a
similar  fashion,  investment  in health adds to the stock of public  assets  such
as hospitals  and other government  infrastructure  affecting health.
Government  saving is defined as minus the government  budget deficit:
-DEF  =  [PVGXG - WMUG - WsSG] +  PROFCB  (100)
+TXREV  - TRH - G - IF0 ER. FLG,l
-IL-,(DCG,- 1 + DLG,-l)
The term in  square  brackets  represents  profits by the  government  from
sales of the public good.  TXREV  denotes total tax revenues whereas TRH
is  government  transfers  to households.  G  represents  total  government  ex-
penditures.  PROFCB represent  profits  from  the  central  bank.  The  final
two terms in the government budget include interest payments on loans from
abroad,  and  interest  payments  on  domestic  loans  by the  central  bank  and
commercial  banks  (see Figure 6).
Using the definition  of net  profits  of the central bank given in equation
(96), government  saving can  be rewritten as
-DEF  =  PVGXG  - WMUG -WSSG  (101)
+TXREV - TRH - G -IFG  -ER. (FLG,_ 1 - FF- 1 )
-IL-DLG,-l.
Total tax  revenues,  TXREV,  consist  of revenue  generated  by  import
tariffs  (net of export subsidies),  sales taxes, and income taxes:
TXREV  =  (WPmANtmANMANER)  +  (wpmptmpMpER)  (102)
- (wpeATteATEATER)  - (wpeptepEpER) +  indtaxiPXiXi
+inctaxr(YHAT +  YHAN)  + inctaxuu(YHuF +  YHs)
+inctaXKAP  (YHKAP).
Note that in  this prototype  framework  we  do not  account  explicitly  for
payroll taxes,  although this could  be important  to study  complementarities
between tax and labor  market reforms.
Government expenditure  is defined as investment in infrastructure,  IINF,
investment  in  health,  IHi investment  in education,  IE,  and  other  current
47expenditures  besides  labor  costs,  Gc,  which  are  all  considered  exogenous
policy  variables:
G=IINF+IE+IH+Gc.  (103)
Government  investment  increases  the  stock  of  public  capital  in  either
infrastructure,  education  or health.  The stock of public capital  in education
includes items  such as  school buildings,  whereas the stock of health  capital
includes hospitals and the like.  Infrastructure capital includes all other stocks
of public property,  such as roads, railroads,  and power plants.  Accumulation
of each type of capital is defined  as:
Ki = Kj,_ 1 (1 -i)  +  pQPl ,  where i = INF, H,  E,  and where 0 < 8i < 1.
(104)
The main reason  for treating government  capital at a disaggregated  level
is that,  as noted earlier,  we want to capture the different long-run effects that
the allocation of public resources may have on the economy and ultimately on
the poor.  For instance,  in our model the stock of capital in education affects
skills acquisition  according to equation  (24).  Infrastructure  and health capi-
tal affect  the production process  in the private sector  as they both combine
to produce the stock of government  capital,  KG:
KG =  CES(KINF, KH).  (105)
As discussed  below,  the various  channels  through which  different  forms
of government  investment  flows affect the economy figure prominently in our
analysis  of the impact of debt-reduction  strategies and expenditure realloca-
tion.  In particular,  we  discuss the issue of how,  for a given reduction in the
stock of foreign loans  to the government  (and thus  lower interest  payments
on external public debt),  public  spending  should be  reallocated  in order  to
achieve specific  poverty reduction  goals  and growth targets.
The government  deficit  is financed by either an increase  in foreign loans,
domestic loans,  or domestic  credit by the central bank:
DEF = ER  L  AFLc +  ADLG + AXDC.  (106)
In general,  a variety of financing  rules  can  be specified  in IMMPA.  For
instance,  it could  be assumed that the deficit  is financed  by domestic  loans
(through either commercial banks or the central bank)  or foreign borrowing,
or that it be closed  by cuts  in government  spending.  Considering  domestic
48financing  alternatives  could be  useful for  analyzing the crowding-out  effects
of public spending  on private investment,  as is  done for instance  by Agenor
and El Aynaoui  (2003).  In the numerical results reported below,  we assume
that the sources  of deficit  financing  are set exogenously  and  thus that the
public sector deficit is determined  from  "below the line."  The  variable that
adjusts  expenditures  to make  them  consistent  with the  available  financing
and the  level  of revenues  is  the level  of lump-sum  transfers  to  households.
The  choice  of a  specific  financing  rule  (which  is  critical  for  simulations  of
many  shocks)  is an important  aspect  of adapting the IMMPA  prototype to
specific countries.
The net worth of the government,  NWG,  is defined  as:
NWG = PK(KG + KE) - (DLG +  DCG) - ER. FLG,  (107)
and evolves  over time  according to
NWG  =  NWG,-1 + PK(zAKG +  AKE) - (ADLG  +  ADCG) - ER  A
+APK(KG,- 1 +  KE,-1)  - AER.  FLG,- 1,
with the last two terms on the right-hand side representing  again  valuation
effects  associated  with  changes  in the price  of capital  and  the nominal  ex-
change rate.
Finally,  from  (94)  and  (107),  the  net  worth  of the  consolidated  public
sector,  NWpS,  is given by
NWpS = PK(KG +  KE) - DLG + ER. (FF  - FLG) - MB.  (109)
4  Poverty  and  Income  Distribution  Indica-
tors
There  are several  alternative  approaches  to the analysis  of the poverty and
distributional effects of policy and exogenous  shocks in applied general equli-
librium models.  A popular approach in the CGE literature consists in speci-
fying a relatively large number of homogeneous  household  groups and calcu-
lating average income for each group following a shock and treating the group
as a whole as being poor if average income  is lower than a given poverty line.
This  is  the procedure  followed,  for instance,  by Lofgren  (2001),  in  a  study
49based  on a classification  of households  in fourteen  groups,  of the impact  of
external  shocks  on poverty  in Malawi.  In IMMPA,  the distributional  and
poverty  effects of shocks  are  assessed  in two ways:  first by calculating  a set
of indicators  (for  income  distribution)  based  directly  on  the model's  simu-
lation  results;  second,  by linking IMMPA  simulation results to  a household
expenditure  survey.
Specifically,  two  measures of income  distribution are  generated  directly
from IMMPA:  the Gini  coefficient  and the  Theil inequality  index  (see,  for
instance  Litchfield  (1999)  or  Cowell  (1998)).27  Both  are  based  on  the  six
categories  of households that were identified earlier, that is,  workers located
in the rural traded sector, rural nontraded sector, urban  (unskilled)  informal
economy,  urban unskilled formal sector, urban skilled formal sector, and cap-
italists.  Thus, these indicators  allow the analyst  to study changes in income
distribution and poverty between  groups, under the assumption of complete
homogeneity  within groups  (or  representative  households).  Formally,  they
are defined  as
Gini  =2 2 n2  H  E  E  IYHi - YHjl,  i,  j  = AN, AT, UI, UF,  S, KAP,
i  3
where n = 6 is the number of household  categories  and YH =  YHi/n is
the arithmetic  mean level of disposable  income for household categories.
The Theil inequality index  is measured  as
Theil  Y  ffllog(YHi),  i = AN, AT, UI, UF,  S, KAP,
n  YH  YH
and other variables  are as defined  above.  We  also calculate these two indica-
tors using consumption,  instead of disposable  income.28
27Other commonly-used indicators include the Atkinson index which,  like the Gini index,
ranges  from  0 to 1.  For a  detailed  analytical discussion  of the pros  and  cons  of various
mneasures  of income  inequality,  see  Cowell  (1998).  For  instance,  the Atkinson  index  is
sensitive  to  inequality  changes  in  the  lowest  part  of the income  distribution;  the  Gini
coefficient  is sensitive  to inequality  changes around  the median;  and the Theil  index and
coefficient of variation are both sensitive to inequality changes in the top part of the income
distribution.
28The  initial values  from  IMMPA  are  0.512  and  0.515  for the consumption-based  and
income-based Gini coefficients  respectively,  and 0.199 and 0.203 for the consumption-based
and income-based  Theil indexes.
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(as  well  as  those  derived  from  household  surveys,  as  discussed  below):  a
short-term measure  (first  two  periods  following  a shock),  a  medium-term
measure  (between  3  and  5  periods),  and  a  long-term measure  (between  6
and  10 periods).29 While  somewhat arbitrary in the choice of intervals,  the
importance  of these measures  (which can obviously be calculated  only with
a dynamic  model)  is  clear:  they  allow the analyst to identify  and  discuss
possible  dynamic trade-offs in the analysis  of policy  choices,  by contrasting
their short-  and longer-run  effects  on the poor.
To  assess  the  poverty  effects  of alternative  shocks,  we  link  IMMPA  to
a household  income  and expenditure  survey,  such  as  an Integrated  Survey
(IS)  or Living Standards  Measurement  Survey (LSMS),  which typically col-
lect extensive information on migration,  household  income and expenditure
(including  own consumption),  household  assets,  credits  and  savings,  levels
of education,  apprenticeship  and training,  employment,  occupational  char-
acteristics  and status,  as well  as geographical  location.30 The  various steps
involved in our approach are illustrated in Figure 7.  To begin with, we assume
that the available  survey consists  of a relative large sample.  This  is needed
to reduce non-sampling  errors that may cause household income  and expen-
diture to be underestimated-particularly  in  the least  monetized  regions  of
predominantly  nontraded agricultural  production  (see  Fofack  (2000))-and
ensure  sound  inference  on  poverty  effects  following  changes  in  factor  allo-
cation  and  resource  flows  across  sectors.  The  approach  that  we  propose
proceeds  as follows:
Step 1.  The user uses the information provided in the household survey of
29Specifically,  let xz denote the initial (base period)  value of consumption (or income) for
household  group  h and  {gt}jt1=  the (discounted)  growth rate in consumption  (or ijncome)
generated  by  the model for  the first  10  years following a shock.  The short-run  measure
of consumption,  xSR,  is calculated  as  a geometric  average  of the  period-1  and  period-2
values  of xh,  calculated  at  the average  growth  rate for  the period,  xZR(1)  and  xsR(2):
XSR  =  xhR(s)XhR( 2)  =  VxO(1  +g9SR)  x  (l + gsR) 2, where 9SR  =  /(1  + 91)(1 + 92)-
1. Thus, xsR  =  Xo(1  + gsR)' 5 Similarly,  it can be shown  that the medium-run  value of
cornsumption,xmR  iS given by  XhMR  =  (  + 9MR)
2 , where 9MR  =  vft.=3(1 + 9t) -1,
whereas  the long-run  level of consumption,  xLR,  is  given  by xLR= x5(  +  9LR)
3 with
9LR  =  ft_06(1 + gt) - 1.  See Chen et al.  (2001) for more details on this procedure.
30For more details on the  scope and  content of these surveys,  see Delaine  et al.  (1992)
for Integrated  Surveys and Grosh and Glewwe  (2000)  for LSMS surveys.  See also Deaton
(1997)  for a general discussion.
51its choice (presumably the most recent information available) to classify
the  available sample into the six categories  of households contained  in
the INMMPA  framework (using,  say,  information on the main source  of
income of household heads)  so as to establish an interface between the
model's predictions  and actual household  income and expenses.
Step 2.  Following a shock to the model, IMMPA generates real growth rates
in per capita consumption  and disposable income  for all six categories
of households  in the economy,  up to the end of the simulation horizon
(say, T periods).
Step  3.  These growth rates  are applied separately  to the per capita  (dis-
posable)  income  and  consumption  expenditure  of each household  (in
each of the six  groups) in the survey.  This  gives absolute  income  and
consumption  levels  for each individual  (and averages  for  each  group)
following the shock,  for T periods.
Step  4.  Assuming  different  initial  poverty  lines  for the rural  and urban
sectors  (expressed in monetary units and adjusted  over time to reflect
increases in rural and urban price indexes),  and using the new absolute
nominal levels of income and consumption  for each individual and each
group, the model calculates  a poverty headcount  index,  a poverty gap
index,  as  well  as the two  indicators  of income  distribution  described
above  (the  Gini  coefficient  and  the  Theil  inequality  index).  These
calculations  are  performed  for  the  three  different  horizons  identified
earlier.
Step 5.  Compare the post-shock poverty and income distribution indicators
with the baseline values to assess the impact of the shock on the poor.
These  comparisons,  as indicated  above,  are based  on the assumption
that the  poverty  line is  constant  in real terms in both the rural  and
urban sectors-an assumption that can obviously be relaxed.
The two poverty  indexes that are described  in Step 4  are defined as fol-
lows.  The poverty headcount index  is the ratio of the number of individuals
in the group whose  income is below the poverty line to the total number of
52individuals in that group.31 The poverty gap index is defined  as:
1  n
PG =  YH.  1:  (YH  - YHk),
Ak=1
where k is an individual whose income is below the poverty line, n is the total
number of people in the group below the poverty  line, YHk  is the income of
individual k,  and YH*  is the poverty  line.
In practice, of course,  whether income or expenditure data should be pre-
ferred depends on the scope and quality of the data in the available household
survey.  In the illustrative simulations reported  below,  we used instead of an
actual household  income and expenditure  survey a "fictitious"  one, that we
built  as  follows.  First,  we calculated  real per capita disposable  income  and
consumption  expenditure  for each of our six household  categories,  using the
initial values that are provided to solve the model numerically.  Second,  using
a  random number  generator  and  a log-normal  distribution,  we produced  a
sample of 1,397 observations  (corresponding  to the total number of workers
and capitalists  in the initial  data set).  We thus  considered  each individual
worker  and  capitalist  to represent  one household.  Third,  we  used  the  ini-
tial per capita income and consumption  data as mean values and imposed a
standard  error of 0.5  for all  household categories,  except for skilled workers
and capitalists,  for which  we  chose a standard  error of 0.35.  We set (some-
what  arbitrarily)  the income  poverty  line for  the rural  sector at  0.45  and
0.5175  for the urban sector  (or  15%  higher than the rural poverty  line).  For
the  consumption  data,  we  used initial poverty  lines of 0.4  and  0.46 for  the
rural  and  urban sectors  (again,  with the  latter being  15%  higher  than  the
former).  We  assume for  simplicity that these poverty  lines remain constant
in real terms for the whole horizon of the simulation period that we consider
below  (10  periods).  Figures  8  and  9  show  a log-normal  approximation  to
the initial  data  on income  and  consumption  that  we generated  for  each  of
31As  is well known, the headcount index suffers from several limitations (see for instance
Blackwood  and  Lynch  (1994)  and  Ravallion  (1994)).  In  particular,  it  does not  indicate
how poor the poor really are-it remains  unchanged  even if all people  with incomes  below
the poverty line were to experience,  say, a 50 percent drop in income.  Put differently,  when
a poor person becomes  poorer, the index does not increase.  Moreover,  it implies that the
distribution  of income  among  the poor  is  homogeneous  (it does not distinguish  between
a poor person who  earns one monetary  unit less than the poverty line and a poor person
who  earns  100  monetary  units  less than  the poverty  line).  But  to the  extent that  the
analyst is interested only in the number  of poor, the headcount index is a useful  measure.
53our six  categories  of households.  This parametric approximation  is of course
very good,  given that the artificial samples that we generated were based on
the  log-normal  distribution  itself.  More  generally,  a number  of alternative
statistical  distributions-such  as the beta distribution-can be specified  in
IMMPA to approximate  the actual  distribution of any given  income group
(see Agenor  and Grimm  (2003)).
These results produced an income-based headcount index of 61.8 % in the
agricultural  sector  (86.1%  in the nontraded  sector  and  37.2%  in the traded
sector),  52.8%  for urban unskilled  households  (78.8%  in the informal sector
and 14.0% for unskilled workers in the formal sector), and 0% for skilled work-
ers and  capitalists.  For the economy  as  a whole, the  income-based  poverty
rate amounted  to  53.2%.  With the income-based  poverty  gap,  the results
obtained  were  38.9  %  for  the  agricultural  sector  (44.0%  in the nontraded
sector and 26.8% in the traded sector),  40.8% for urban unskilled households
(43.8%  in the informal  sector and 15.7%  for unskilled  workers  in the formal
sector)  and  again  0%  for  skilled workers  and  capitalists.32 The  aggregate
poverty gap index reached  38.7%.  For the consumption-based  headcount  in-
dex, the results  are 64.4  % in the agricultural sector  (88.7% in the nontraded
sector and 39.8% in the traded sector),  62.3% for urban unskilled households
(91.8%  in the informal  sector  and 18.4%  for unskilled  workers  in the formal
sector),  and  0%  for  skilled  workers  and  capitalists.  For  the economy  as  a
whole,  the  consumption-based  poverty  rate amounted  to  56.9%.  With the
consumption-based  poverty gap, we obtained 40.6  % for the agricultural  sec-
tor  (47.0%  in the nontraded  sector  and  26.1%  in the traded  sector),  46.3%
for urban unskilled  households  (50.0%  in the informal  sector  and  18.9%  for
unskilled workers in the formal sector)  and again 0%  for skilled workers and
capitalists.  The aggregate poverty gap index reached  41.4%.  These numbers
are broadly  in line with the evidence  for sub-Saharan Africa.
For  each  policy  or  exogenous  shock,  therefore,  the user  can  assess  the
short-,  medium-,  and long-term  effects  on poverty and  income  distribution
and thus examine  possible trade-offs  with other policy objectives.  The main
benefit of this approach is that it allows  us to link IMMPA simulation results
directly  with  actual patterns  of income  and  expenditure  and to provide  a
32For  unemployed  skilled  workers  (who  do  not  receive wage  income  but  are  assumed
to receive  interest  income  on financial  assets as well  as government  transfers  and  a share
of distributed  profits  by  firms  in the  private  sector),  the average  income  is  close  to the
poverty line  in the base period.  For simplicity, we  treat the group of skilled  workers as a
homogeneous one and generate a distribution in which no skilled worker  is poor.
54more accurate derivation  of poverty indicators.  However,  as noted  above,  it
assumes that intra-group distribution is constant.  Put differently, the within-
group homogeneity assumption  implies that the within-group  rank ordering
of households  and  individuals  remains  unchanged  following any  shock.  As
noted by Kanbur  (1987)  and Demery  and Addison  (1993)  in a related  con-
text, the assumption that within-group distributions  are unchanged  and un-
affected  by policy shocks implies that workers  are withdrawn from the sector
of origin in a representative manner  (leaving the distribution of income there
unchanged)  and that, as they move from one sector to another, they assume
the  income  distribution characteristics  of the sector  of destination  (in par-
ticular,  the variance of income in that sector is assumed to apply to all  new
entrants).33  Thus, some  workers  may be poor not because of their personal
characteristics  but  because  of the economic  circumstances that characterize
their  sector  of employment.  Whether  the  assumption  of constant  within-
group  distributions  is  always  warranted  is  not  entirely  clear;  it represents
therefore  a potential weakness  in this approach.
The procedure  described above assumes that the modeler matches house-
holds as defined in the macro component of IMMPA  and a household survey
using  information  on the  main  source  of income  of household  heads.  An
alternative  treatment  is  also  possible  and  depends  on  whether  or  not  the
household  survey  provides  sufficient  detail regarding the composition  of in-
come  among individual  members  of each household;  "light surveys"  tend to
concentrate on the household  head,  whereas  more  in-depth  surveys provide
richer  information.  To the  extent that  the information  is  detailed  enough,
and  as  long  as  each  member  of a household  can  be  "allocated"  to  one  of
the  six  income  groups  identified  earlier,  growth  rates  of income  and  con-
sumption  can  be  applied  separately  to  each  individual  income  earner  (as
in Step  3  above).  A  more  accurate  measure  of the  change  in each  house-
hold's income can therefore be calculated  and poverty and income indicators
can be  generated  using  either  "individual"  income  earners  or  "composite"
households.  However,  whether  accounting  for  heterogeneity  in the  sources
of income among individual  household members makes  a difference  or not is
generally  case  specific;  it  depends  on both the  characteristics  of the  intra-
household  distribution  of income  (which  depends  on each  household's  risk
33It also implies  that income transfers  between  households  in  any given group  are ig-
nored.  In  practice,  intra-group  income  reallocation  may  be large  in  periods  of hardship
and may  represent  an  important  factor  in  understanding  the poverty  effects  of  adverse
economic  shocks.
55diversification strategies)  and the extent to which the growth rates of income
and consurnption generated by the macro component  of IMMPA  following a
given shock differ among the various  income groups on which it is based.  If,
for instance,  the intra-household  distribution  as  given in the survey  is such
that most of the income of each composite unit is generated by the household
head,  treating the household as  a homogeneous  unit and applying the same
growth rate of income  to each member should not result in significant errors.
Several recent studies have attempted to drop the assumption of a stable
within-group distribution to analyze the poverty and distributional  effects of
policy and exogenous  shocks  in applied general  equilibrium models;  they in-
clude Cockburn (2001), Decaluwe, Dumont and Savard (1999), and Decaluwe,
Patry,  Savard,  and Thorbecke  (1999).  Individual  data  in these studies  are
included  directly in the  general  equilibrium  model  and  (assuming  that the
within-group  distribution  follows  a well-defined  statistical distribution,  such
as the lognormal or a beta distribution)  micro-simulation techniques are used
to exploit intra-group  information.  This approach  has the benefit  of allowing
the analyst to distinguish,  in the evolution of poverty indicators,  the specific
contribution of three factors:  changes in the poverty  line  (when it is treated
as endogenous),  average  income variations,  and income distribution.  It pro-
vides  therefore  a  potentially  important  direction  for future  research.34 At
the same time,  however,  it must be  recognized  that it is relatively  complex
to  implement  (particularly  in  conjunction  with a  fully  specified  macroeco-
nomic  model,  like ours),  because  it requires  manipulating  a sizable  amount
of data.  Moreover,  whether  changes  in the intra-group  distribution matter
a lot  appears  to be shock  dependent;  indeed,  in some  of the  simulation re-
sults reported  by  Decaluwe,  Dumont  and  Savard  (1999),  such  changes  only
account  for  a  small  proportion  in  changes  in  poverty  measures.  A  possi-
ble  way of testing for  whether  this type  of techniques  should be used  is to
compare  the aggregated  results  of two  (or  more,  where  feasible)  household
surveys  and test statistically  (using parametric  or non-parametric  tests)  for
any  evidence  of a  shift in  intra-group  distributions.  This test is  not,  how-
ever,  fully  satisfactory,  because  evidence  of stability  across  surveys  cannot
necessarily  be  construed  as  providing  definite  support  to any model-based
experiment-particularly  those involving  "atypical"  shocks.
It is  also worth noting that in the  artificial  survey that  we constructed,
34Another  approach,  based  also  on micro-simulation  techniques,  is  pursued  by  Robil-
liard, Alatas, Bourguignon,  and  Robinson  (2001).
56we did not account for openly unemployed workers,  of either variety.  In prac-
tice,  however,  surveys may report a head of household  as being unemployed
(and therefore with no declared  wage income), while at the same time receiv-
ing non-wage  income from,  say,  holdings  of financial  assets  and government
transfers.  Instead  of simply  assuming that the rate of growth of income  or
consumption  is  zero  for the  unemployed  (an  assumption  that  may  lead  to
unrealistic  results  for medium-term  exercises),  our inclination  would  be to
treat  these  observations  as  follows.  For  unskilled  workers,  it would  seem
reasonable to assume that the openly unemployed  are actually  employed in
the informal sector or the nontradable agricultural sector (even if they don't
declare it),  depending  on the sector  of occupation,  at the going  wage.  One
can thus apply the growth rates of consumption and  "full" disposable income
taken from  the macro component  of IMMPA  for that category  of workers,
as in the sequence described previously.  By contrast,  for skilled workers, the
assumption that the unemployed  are actually working in the informal sector
may not  be very satisfactory,  for  the  reasons  discussed  earlier.  We would
suggest using the growth rate of pre-tax,  non-wage income only, for that cat-
egory of workers,  and adjust the rate of growth of consumption taken from
the  macro component  of IMMPA  in proportion  to the  differential  between
disposable income  of employed workers and pre-tax non-wage  income.
Finally, it should be noted that we have abstracted in the above discussion
from  issues  associated with  differences  between  national  accounts  data (on
which IMMPA is based)  and survey data  (from which  poverty measures  are
calculated).  However,  in practice, large discrepancies can arise between these
two sets of data.  In particular, it is possible that the composition  of employ-
ment, output, and the inter-group income distribution generated  by IMMPA
and the  household  survey  (following  step  1 above)  are  different.35 Indeed,
it is well recognized  that  national accounts  and survey estimates  of income
and consumption patterns can differ significantly.  Moreover,  these differences
may even be increasing in some cases, as appears to be the case in India (see
Deaton (2001)).  In general, the evidence suggests that nominal consumption
growth rates estimated from survey data tends to be substantially lower than
35As indicated  earlier,  for the simulation  exercises  reported in this paper, we generated
an artificial sample  (based  on  a log-normal  distribution)  using  the mean  per capita  real
income data generated by the initial calibration  of the model.  The inter-group  Gini  coef-
ficients  that are calculated from the model and  from the household  survey are thus very
close,  given the relatively  large number of replications.  In practice,  however,  this may or
may not be the case.
57those estimated  from national  accounts  data.  Various  factors  may  account
for these discrepancies,  as discussed  by Deaton  (2001)  and Ravallion  (2000).
For instance,  consumption  in  national  accounts  is typically  determined  as
a residual  and is  thus contaminated  by errors  and  omissions  elsewhere  in
the  accounts.  In  practice,  researchers  often  end  up treating  one  source  or
the other as the  "correct"  or "most reliable"  one-despite the fact that it is
likely that both sources  of information  are subject to  error.  In the present
context,  because  both sources are used jointly, the issue of reconciling them
arises.  For instance,  if it is believed that the national accounts data provide
an accurate  measure of the  level of consumption,  one approach  could  be to
scale  up. survey  data so as  to match the former,  and use  the rescaled  data
for poverty assessment.  There are several potential problems, of course,  with
this approach-the  assumption that  household  consumption  levels  as mea-
sured in the survey are correct up to a multiplicative constant is by no means
a reliable  one,  given the likely discrepancies  between  urban and rural  data.
More  generally,  the decision  as  to which data are correct  is  a difficult  one,
and the reconciliation  process  is likely to be country specific.
5  Calibration
Assessing  the properties  of the  model presented  in the  previous section  re-
quires  calibration  and  numerical  simulations.  Given  that the objective  of
the model is to analyze the poverty impact of adjustment  policies in highly-
indebted, low-income  countries, we have calibrated  it to reflect  what we be-
lieve to be a "representative"  country.  While parameters  and  initial values
for  each of the variables  in the model  are provided in Appendix  C, we  also
provide  a brief summary for  the key variables  below.  Many  of these para-
meters  (such  as demand  and supply elasticities)  reflect  conventional  values
.used in the literature.  A financial  social accounting  matrix (FSAM),  follow-
ing the  lines  of Thorbecke  et  al.  (1992),  Easterly  (1990),  Rosensweig  and
Taylor  (1990),  and Thissen (1999,  2000),  presents all initial values in a more
pedagogical  format.
We  now provide  a brief overview  of the calibration  of initial values  and
parameters.  A detailed  analysis is provided in Chen et al.  (2001).
585.1  Inlitial Values
5.1.1  Endogenous  Variables
For  the  first  period,  we  assume  that  our  "representative"  economy  has  a
nominal GDP of approximately 850 units and we set agricultural production
to be about 30 percent of GDP, with slightly more than four-fifths of it being
traded  and  the  remainder  being  nontraded.  We  further  assume  that  the
private,  formal  urban sector  produces  15 percent,  the informal sector about
43 percent,  and the public sector  12 percent  of the country's total output.
The size of the total workforce in the first period has been set to 1416, with
829 persons residing in the rural area, about 40 percent of which are employed
in the traded agricultural  sector.  There are about 467 urban unskilled work-
ers,  eighty  percent  of which  are employed  in the informal  economy.  There
are 121 skilled workers,  with 46 of them being employed  in the private urban
formal  sector, and another  50 are working  in the public sector.  This  implies
that the initial open unemployment  rate for skilled workers  is about  20 per-
cent.  The reproductive growth rate of urban  unskilled individuals  has been
set to 2.2 percent  in the initial period.
The skilled  nominal wage rate has been set to approximately 30 percent
above that of the binding minimum wage paid to unskilled workers employed
in the formal-urban economy.  Rural workers employed in the traded agricul-
tural sector receive about 35 percent of the urban minimum  wage.
Aggregate  demand  consists  of households'  consumption,  private  invest-
ment  and government  expenditures.  Demand  for the formal,  private urban
good  is  approximately  600  units,  whereas  demand  for the  nontraded  agri-
cultural  good  is  190  units.  Demand  for the  public  good  is  286  units,  and
demand for informal goods is  152 units.
The level  of agricultural goods exported is 371  units and imports of non-
traded agricultural goods have been assumed to be 75 units in the first period.
Domestic  demand for nontraded  agricultural  goods  is set  at 123  units.  Im-
ports of the formal private good are assumed to be 486 units.  Also, we have
assumed exports  and domestic demand of the private formal good to be 215
units and  114 units,  respectively.
First-period values for household incomes range from a value of 61  for the
nontraded  agricultural  sector household to 217 for the capitalist household.
Private urban formal firms made the highest profits with a profit level of 179.
The nontraded agricultural fi,ns were assumed to have the lowest profit levels
59of about  30.  Incomes  of firms mirror that of profits with private urban firms
earning the highest income  (168 units),  and nontraded agricultural  firms the
lowest  income  (30 units).
The  return  to capital  is initially set to  12  percent,  whereas  the lending
rate  is  set to 7  percent,  with a financial  premium  of 1.07.  The amount  of
domestic loans  to private urban firms  is  assumed to be  154, whereas  banks
have foreign liabilities of 62.  The stock of private capital has been set to 1500,
whereas  the initial  capital stock in  infrastructure  has  been set to 500,  and
that for education  and health have been set to 50  each.  The initial stock of
public capital has also been set at 50 units.  With a reserve requirement ratio
of 10 percent,  and total bank deposits of 213,  the level of required reserves is
21.  The money supply is initially at  152.  The initial  values of tax revenue,
transfers  to households, the budget deficit and total government  expenditure
as  shares  of GDP  are  23  percent,  15  percent,  1.3  percent  and  37 percent,
respectively.
5.1.2  Exogenous  Variables
Both the initial  numbers of skilled  and unskilled  workers  in the public sec-
tor  have  been  set to  50  persons  and  grow  at a  constant  rate  of  2 percent
annually.  The real  minimum wage rate  of urban workers  and the real wage
rate paid to workers in the rural traded sector are kept constant throughout.
The reproductive  growth rate of rural workers  has been set to 2 percent per
annum.
Constant  income tax rates of 15  percent,  23  percent and  33 percent  are
being  levied on unskilled  (both agricultural and urban),  skilled  and capital-
ists.  There  are  no tariffs or export  subsidies for  agricultural  goods.  Private
urban goods have a 4 percent import tariff imposed but also enjoy a 5 percent
export subsidy.
Foreign  loans  to private  firms  amount  initially  to  136.6  and grow  at  9
percent  in every period.  The  initial values for investment in infrastructure,
health and education  have'been set to  10 and each  grows  at a fixed rate of
2  percent per period.  We have assumed that depreciation  for infrastructure
capital occurs at 1 percent per annum.
Government  consumption has a initial value of 40 and grows at 2 percent
thereafter.  Domestic  credit  to  government  has  an  initial  value  of 50  and
grows  also at an annual rate  of 2 percent  thereafter.  Domestic loans to the
government has an initial value  of 100 and is kept  constant,  whereas  foreign
60loans to the government  have a starting value of 1567 and grow at 1 percent
annually.  Indirect  tax rates on output have been all set to zero.
5.2  Parameter Values
Recall that all sectors,  with the exception  of the informal sector,  have CES
production functions.  Elasticities  of substitution between the various  inputs
in these production functions have been calibrated to values between  0.4 and
1.2,  reflecting low to medium values.
The  input  share  parameters  have  been  chosen  to reflect  labor-intensive
production technologies  typical  of a developing  country.  In the agricultural
sector,  the labor share parameter is 0.92 for the traded good and 0.63 for the
nontraded good.  Similarly, the labor  (versus public capital)  share parameter
in the public good production function,  I3 xG,  is also relatively high at 0.90.
Production of the private good not only leans heavily toward usage of labor,
with the skilled labor-private  capital composite input share parameter  being
0.90, but also  uses more unskilled labor  rather than skilled labor or capital,
with the  unskilled  labor  share  parameter  having  a  value  of  0.97.  The  re-
productive  growth rate  of the  urban unskilled  workers  has  an  elasticity  to
relative expected  wages  of 0.3.
Recall  that only the agricultural  goods  and private formal  goods  can  be
traded.  The  demand  functions  for  these  goods  are  therefore  expressed  as
Armington  functions  over import  and domestic  demand.  The values for the
share  parameter  (for  import  demand)  and elasticity  of substitution  for the
demand  for  agricultural  goods  are  0.5  and  0.8,  respectively,  whereas  those
for the demand  for private  formal  goods  are 0.8 and  1.01,  respectively.  For
all households,  the largest  consumption  share  is  on goods  produced  by the
sectors in which they are employed.  With the exception of the urban informal
households,  for  all  households  the  smallest  share  of  consumption  went  to
informal  goods.
For  the construction  of the  consumer  price index,  private  urban  goods
were assigned the largest share whereas in the construction of the rural price
index,  agricultural  goods  had  the  largest  weight.  For the  urban  unskilled
price  index,  informal  goods had the largest share.  Lastly,  for  the construc-
tion  of the  urban  skilled  price  index,  private  urban  goods  were  weighted
most heavily.  Money demand elasticities to the domestic and foreign interest
rates have all been set at 0.5,  whereas the elasticity to real income has been
assigned  a uniform value of 1.0.
616  Some  Illustrative Experiments
This  section  presents  and  discusses  the  numerical  results  associated  with
three  types  of shocks:  a temporary  terms-of-trade  shock,  a permanent  cut
in domestic credit to the government,  and a poverty reduction program  con-
sisting  of partial  external  debt  forgiveness  coupled  with  a  reallocation  of
savings  on debt  service  payments  to three  alternative  forms  of government
expenditure:  lump-sum transfers to households,  spending on infrastructure,
and outlays on education.36 Both the short-  and longer-run  effects  of these
shocks  are  analyzed,  with a particular  focus on poverty  as measured  by the
indicators  described above.37
6.1  Terms-of-Trade  Shock
We first simulate the impact of a temporary terms-of-trade  shock that takes
the form  of a transitory  (one  period  only)  10  percent  increase  in the world
market  price  of  the  agricultural  traded  good  (see  Tables  2  and  3).  This
type  of shocks  has  indeed  played  a  pervasive  role  in  explaining  changes  in
real  incomes  in sub-Saharan  Africa  and has  been  analyzed  in  a number  of
empirical studies  (see,  most recently,  Dorosh and Sahn  (2000)).  Because we
have  assumed  that  product  wages  of unskilled  agricultural  traded  workers
are fixed  (that is, the ratio of the nominal wage to the value added  price of
the good is constant),  nominal  wages  will tend to match the increase in the
producer  price.38 Had we  excluded  financial  sector  effects  from the  model,
the demand for labor would remain constant and so would production of the
traded  good.  But  because  we  assume  that  firms  in  this  sector  borrow to
finance  wage payments,  the effective price of labor  includes the loan rate,  as
noted earlier.  As  we  shall  explain later,  interest  rates  experience  an  initial
decline  after the positive  terms-of-trade  shock,  implying  that  the  effective
price  of labor  goes  down.  In itself,  this  tends to  increase  the  demand  for
unskilled  labor.  However,  a  decline  in the real  value  of public  investment,
36For  a description  of the IMMPA  simulation program,  which  consists of both  Eviews
and GAMS versions combined with Ecel input and output sheets,  see Chen et al.  (2001).
371t  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  choice  of a  particular  set  of poverty  measures
always involves a value judgement  and can have considerable bearing on simulation results
and  policy  choices.  The open  architecture  of IMMPA,  however,  allows users to program
alternative  measures if deemed necessary.
38 They do not match the  increase  in price of the agricultural good one to one because
producer  prices also reflect changes in intermediate  input prices.
62due to increasing formal sector goods prices,  leads to an overall  reduction in
value added  and output  in this  sector,  and  lowers  unskilled  labor demand.
Given  that  at  any point  in  time the  total supply of unskilled  labor  in the
agricultural sector is predetermined and that this segment of the labor market
must clear at the aggregate level, workers laid off from the agricultural traded
sector are  absorbed by the nontraded  sector.  But  because of the decline  in
public investment, output  also declines  in the nontraded agricultural sector.
All these dynamics occur in the period following that of the shock, given our
assumption that the cost of credit in loan contracts is agreed upon one period
in advance  and therefore interest rate effects  take one period to materialize.
At the time of the shock though,  interest rate effects are absent and as a result
value added  in both rural sectors remains  constant,  implying no changes  in
the rural traded and rural nontraded workforce.  This occurs because product
wages in both sectors remain constant,  implying that nominal  wages match
the increase  in value  added price of their respective  good.
The increase  in wages in the agricultural sector yields higher income and
higher  consumption  for  households  in that  sector;  this raises  aggregate  de-
mand and put upward pressure on domestic  prices.  A strong price  increase
actually leads to a switch in the demand  for formal sector goods,  away  from
domestic production  and toward imported goods.  Production in the private
formal  sector  therefore  decreases  in response to the  expansion  in spending.
The supply response is partly brought about by the decline in the public cap-
ital stock and partly by price-driven increases  in the skilled (product)  wage,
which  lowers  the  demand  for  skilled  labor.  As  a result,  unemployment  of
skilled workers  increases.  The  decline in skilled employment,  in turn,  lowers
the marginal product of unskilled labor in the private formal sector, lowering
demand for unskilled  labor as  well.  Because  a constant minimum  real wage
prevails for unskilled formal workers, there is a shift in the supply of unskilled
labor from the formal into the informal  economy,  until the marginal product
of labor matches  the minimum  wage.  As a  consequence,  the product  wage
falls in that sector and the size of the informal economy expands.
We next focus on the effects of this shock on migration between rural and
urban areas.  The major  determinant of this decision  is the ratio of average
expected  rural  consumption  wages  to average  expected  urban  consumption
wages.39 In the  case  at  hand,  the increase  in the  price  of the  agricultural
39As  defined  earlier,  consumption wages  are  defined  as  nominal wages  deflated  by the
price index corresponding  to the consumption basket  of workers  in a particular sector.
63traded  good raises  the average  rural wage  by more than the  average  urban
wage,  providing  incentives  to remain  in the agricultural  sector.  This brings
migration down after the shock, but the situation is gradually reversed as the
effect  of the shock dies  out.  In  a similar  fashion,  skills acquisition  depends
on relative consumption wages of urban unskilled versus skilled workers.  The
fact that the expected consumption  wage of skilled workers  goes up whereas
that of unskilled  workers  goes down leads to an increase  in the rate of skills
acquisition  and  an  increase  in  unemployment.  This  increase  is  gradually
reversed as the effect  of the shock  fades  away.
Higher incomes and aggregate demand lead to a rise in tax collection.  Be-
cause the public sector deficit is determined by its sources of financing (which
are taken as exogenous),  and the selected closure rule implies that additional
revenue is devoted to an increase in government  transfers to households, the
initial positive impact of the terms-of-trade  shock  is reinforced  by an expan-
sionary fiscal  policy.  But there  is  also  an additional  effect  of public  sector
finances:  higher  taxes  relative  to the existing  debt  service  are  interpreted
by investors  as  a reduction  in  confiscation  risk,  resulting  thereby  in  a rise
in private investment.  This  in turn generates  an  increase in the demand  for
loans  by firms  which,  in itself,  puts upward  pressure on  the domestic  bank
lending rate (as noted earlier, banks charge a premium over the cost of funds,
which depends inversely on the effective value of collateral relative to the size
of loans).  Nevertheless,  because  the price of capital jumps up by more than
the increase  in loans,  the premium  goes down  and so does the lending rate
on impact.
On the financial  side,  money  holdings  for  all  households  are  higher  on
impact,  and eventually  go back to their original  levels  as the effects  of the
shock vanish.  Although  savings across  households  increase  as a consequence
of higher  incomes,  they  do  not rise  proportionally  to income  because  sav-
ings  rates  are smaller  on impact due  to the temporary increase  in inflation.
Given that the allocation  of savings between  domestic  and  foreign  deposits
is made after choosing the desired level of money holdings, and that the lat-
ter increases  at  a higher rate  than total financial  savings,  then holdings  of
domestic and foreign deposits fall on impact, but quickly increase relative to
the base scenario once inflation  drops and savings  rates go up again.
Higher export  prices for the agricultural  good,  coupled  with the increase
in foreign loans  from  domestic  banks to finance  the higher  level  of private
investment,  more than offset the increase in imports.  As a result, the central
bank accumulates  foreign reserves  and this in turn leads to an expansion  of
64money  supply.  These variables  also return close  to their baseline values  as
the effects of the shock fade away.
We now turn to poverty and income distribution indices based on our fic-
titious household survey data.  The impact and short-run effects of the terms-
of-trade  shock generally result  in reductions  in consumption-based  poverty
headcount indices.  There is a decrease  in the poverty headcount  index of the
agricultural  nontraded  sector, but the largest  decrease  occurs in the agricul-
tural traded sector.  The decrease  in the latter index is  expected,  given the
10 percent  increase in the world price of the exported agricultural  good and
the existence  of fixed real  wages in that sector.  The decrease  in poverty  in
the rural nontraded  sector is mainly due to higher wages,  because increasing
nontraded  agricultural  goods demand  leads  to increasing  labor  demand  in
that sector.  Because there are only smaller  changes  in consumption poverty
headcount  indices  for  the remaining  sectors,  there  is a negative  net  effect
on  the economy-wide  consumption  poverty  index  in the short run.  In the
long run, however,  there is only a slight decrease in the poverty index for the
agricultural traded and nontraded sectors  (given the size and temporary na-
ture of the shock),  which leads to a slight decrease in the consumption-based
poverty headcount  indices  for the rural sector and the economy  as a whole.
Poverty headcount indices based on disposable income depict similar results:
there is a relatively strong decline  in the economy-wide poverty index in the
short run, and a small  decrease in the long run.
Consumption-based  poverty gap  indices  indicate that  poverty decreases
in the  agricultural  traded  and nontraded  sectors  and in the urban  informal
sectors  in the short run.  Given these  decreases,  the  economy-wide  poverty
gap index also decreases despite an increase in poverty in the formal unskilled
labor group.  In the long run, there is also a decrease in the poverty gap index,
although its  magnitude  is  much  smaller.  A  similar  picture  emerges  when
income-based  poverty gap indices are used instead:  the economy experiences
a decrease  in poverty in the short run,  which reverses  itself in the long run.
In summary,  a temporary terms-of-trade  shock has relatively  unambigu-
ous effects on poverty.  Both headcount  and poverty gap indices indicate that
declines  in poverty rates in the short run are reversed in the longer run.
With regard to income  distribution  indicators,  the Gini coefficients  gen-
erally indicate short and long run declines  in income inequality,  whereas the
Theil indices shows short- and long-run increases in income inequality.  Long-
run effects  are generally much smaller than short-run  effects.  Again,  this  is
not surprising,  given the temporary  nature of the shock.
656.2  Cut in Domestic Credit to Government
We next  exploit  the financial  nature of the model to track the  impact  of a
permanent, 30 percent cut in the level of domestic credit by the central bank
to the non-financial public sector, keeping its growth rate constant  after the
first period (see Tables  4 and  5).  This has two effects  on impact.  First, the
fall  in credit reduces  the financing  available  for the public sector,  therefore
requiring a reduction in the deficit  "above the line";  and second, there is a fall
in the monetary  base  (and  consequently the  money supply),  which creates
deflationary pressures.
The reduction in the deficit  is  accomplished  by a proportional  cut in to-
tal lump-sum transfers to households.40 This lowers households'  income and
consumption of all goods.41 Lower government  revenue relative to the exist-
ing level of debt service payments  increases the perceived  risk of confiscation
on impact and leads to a fall in both investment and the demand for domestic
loans.  The  drop  in firms'  loans  is smaller  than  the initial fall  in the  price
of collateral,  providing  incentives  for banks to increase the premium on the
cost  of funds,  thereby  increasing  the  loan  rate.  This  has  a negative  effect
on output  in  production  sectors  that  rely on  bank  credit  to finance  work-
ing capital needs  (wage payments  here), namely the agricultural  traded  and
urban  private formal  sectors,  because  the  effective  price  of labor  increases
after the initial jump  in the loan rate  (given  our  assumption  that the cost
of credit in loan contracts is  agreed upon one period in advance).  Neverthe-
less, production  expands in both the traded  agricultural  and urban private
formal sectors.  A lower  price of formal  sector  goods leads to an increase  in
real investment  by the government,  and the expansion of public capital dom-
inates the increase  in working capital costs in both sectors.  In addition,  the
product  wage of skilled labor declines,  given that the fall in the price of the
composite  factor  is  much  smaller  than that of nominal skilled  wages.  The
latter  effect  dominates  over  the  interest  rate  effect,  leading to an  increase
in demand for formal skilled  labor,  and an  increase in output  in the private
formal sector.  The urban unskilled workforce  also increases,  because the in-
crease in the (expected)  urban consumption wage  is larger than the increase
in the (expected)  agricultural  consumption  wage.
In spite of higher  interest  rates,  the  increase  in the public  capital  stock
40Transfers  could be negative, in which case they can be interpreted as non-distortionary
taxes.
4'With the exception of the informal good.
66leads to a higher demand of unskilled labor in the rural traded sector,  and a
transfer  of unskilled workers  from the rural nontraded  into the rural traded
sector.  Notwithstanding  the decline in labor  supply  in the nontraded  agri-
cultural  sector,  output in that sector expands  due to the increase  in public
capital.  In subsequent  periods,  wage increases  lead to increases in the prod-
uct  wage.  But  because  households  in the  rural nontraded  sector  consume
a  bundle  of goods  whose  price  index  increases  more  than nominal  wages,
consumption  wages  fall for workers  employed there.
The contraction in aggregate  demand,  together with the increase in out-
put in the urban private  formal sector,  leads to a strong decline  in imports
and a smaller  expansion  in  exports;  the improvement  in the trade  balance
leads to higher official reserves, which tend to mitigate the impact of the orig-
inal reduction in domestic  credit to the government  on domestic liquidity.  In
subsequent  periods,  the fall  in both private  investment  and  the associated
demand for domestic loans reduces the need for external financing  of banks,
thereby  reducing  the  rate of accumulation  of foreign  reserves.  The initial
fall in money demand  leads to a reallocation  of financial  assets,  namely,  an
increase  in holdings of both domestic and foreign deposits.42 The increase  in
domestic  deposits lessens the need for external financing  of domestic banks,
whereas the increase  in foreign deposits abroad by domestic households gen-
erates  a capital  outflow.  Both  factors  put  downward  pressure  on  foreign
reserves  and the expansion  of money supply.  The final outcome of all these
forces  is a fall in money supply,  which has deflationary  effects  that are con-
sistent with the observed  initial fall in the price level.
Because we assume that domestic credit grows at the same rate as in the
base scenario beyond the initial period, most variables converge to their pre-
shock  levels  in the long  run.  The reason  for a relatively rapid  convergence
is that  the initial value of domestic  credit to the  government  as a share  of
GDP  is relatively  small,  implying that  (given our  assumption  of a constant
deficit)  the initial  level cut does not alter significantly  the path of domestic
credit for government  budget  financing purposes in future periods.
Consumption per capita falls temporarily for all categories of workers.  On
the one hand, consumption wages of unskilled workers in the rural traded sec-
tor as well as in the urban formal sector increase,  whereas those of unskilled
42Even though savings fall as a consequence of lower income,  the reduction in the infla-
tion rate increases savings rates on impact.  This,  coupled with the fall in money demand,
lead  to higher resources  available for  investment  into other financial assets  (domestic and
foreign deposits).
67workers  in the rural nontraded  and urban informal sectors and skilled work-
ers  in the formal  sector  decrease.  On the other,  all  households  face  lower
transfer receipts from the government,  mainly as a direct consequence of the
drop in government  domestic  credit,  but also because of lower tax revenues
resulting  from the fall  in aggregate  demand.  This impact  of lower  transfer
receipts counteracts  any wage gains, leading to falls in household income and
lower consumption  levels.
Consumption-based  poverty  headcount  indices  show  that  poverty  de-
creases  only  in the formal  unskilled  labor  group  in the  short  run.  Never-
theless,  poverty  is  unchanged  for  all  groups  in the  long  run.  Turning  to
income-based  poverty headcount  indices,  we observe that poverty  decreases
in the formal  unskilled labor group in both the short and the long run.  The
economy-wide  income-based poverty headcount  index increases less than its
consumption-based  counterpart  in the  short  run,  whereas  both  indices  are
unchanged  in the  long  run.  Poverty  gap  indices,  both  consumption  and
income-based,  show that poverty at the aggregate level increases both in the
short  and the  long  run.  However,  they  also  indicate that the  increase  in
poverty  is  greater  in  the  short  run than  in  the long  run.  Hence,  all  four
poverty indices show that poverty changes,  as a result of the domestic credit
shock,  are relatively small in the long run.
Both consumption-  and income-based  Gini  coefficients indicate that the
domestic credit shock has a negative effect on income distribution, both in the
short and the long run.  However,  Theil indices generally  imply that income
distribution  becomes  more equal with the domestic credit  shock.  Thus, the
effect  of the shock on income distribution  is ambiguous.
6.3  Debt Reduction  and Expenditure  Reallocation
An important  policy  experiment  for  highly-indebted  low-income  countries
involves  debt relief and fiscal adjustment.  We analyze three different  deficit-
neutral scenarios that differ in the allocation  of the savings resulting from  a
permanent,  5  percent reduction  in the stock  of public external  debt.43 The
first scenario  (which  we take as  our benchmark)  corresponds  to the case  in
which savings  are allocated  to  an increase  in lump-sum  transfers  to house-
holds,  in  proportion  to their  initial  shares.  The  next  two  scenarios  focus
43Because  we assume  that contracted  foreign  public  sector  debt has  infinite  maturity,
debt service consists  of interest payments only.
68on the allocation of savings to investment  in education and investment in in-
frastructure, respectively.44 One of the attractive features of our model is that
it also  permits the analysis of the effects  of mixed policies-a  combination,
for instance,  of investment in education with investment in infrastructure-a
particularly relevant consideration  for policymakers who must determine the
allocation of public  expenditure.  We contrast the  effects  of a mixed policy
package  with those of  "pure"  policies  that imply full allocation  to just one
type of investment,  but for brevity  we do not go over  a detailed  account  of
this additional simulation.
Throughout  the discussion  we  assume that the non-financial public sec-
tor  deficit  remains  constant  at  base  scenario  levels.  For  many  developing
countries,  the initial position may be one in which the fiscal deficit  is unsus-
tainable and creating  undue pressure on inflation.  In such conditions,  there
is a good case for using savings from debt reduction to bring the deficit down
to sustainable  levels,  if increases in taxation are not  feasible.  We abstract,
however,  from  these  considerations  and  examine  the  effects  of alternative
ways of spending the income saved from debt reduction,  because our interest
lies in understanding the effects of alternative strategies for expenditure allo-
cation.  We implicitly  assume that the starting fiscal position is sustainable,
be it because of continuing foreign aid or proper fiscal management,  although
this can be easily  modified  (by considering alternative  sources  of financing)
to consider jointly the case of debt reduction coupled with a cut  in the fiscal
deficit.
6.3.1  Transfers to Households
We first consider the case in which the savings (current and future) associated
with debt reduction  are rebated to all  households  in the form  of lump-sum
transfers  (see Tables  6 and 7).  Specifically,  we assume that the government
allocates  these transfers  according  to initial household shares.45 This policy
has immediate  demand-side  effects:  the positive  impact  on households'  in-
comes  leads  to an increase  in some components  of consumption  and money
44As  noted  earlier,  the  model also  incorporates  investment  in  health;  but because  its
effects are similar to investment in infrastructure (that is, both types of investment increase
labor productivity)  they are not reported separately.
45This implies that as long as groups differ in size, transfers  per capita are not the same
across  groups.  An  alternative  scenario  would  be  to  assume  that  only  poor  households
receive transfers.
69holdings.46 At  the same  time,  the reduction  in the stock  of external  debt
reduces  interest  payments,  and the increase  in income yields higher  govern-
ment  revenues.  These  two effects  have a positive  impact  on private  capital
formation,  because both contribute to a reduction in confiscation risk.  Higher
private investment implies a higher demand for domestic loans to firms, which
in turn leads to an increase in the premium charged by domestic banks47 and
a proportional  increase in the loan rate.
The higher lending rate increases the effective  price of labor in the agri-
cultural  traded  sector,  thereby  reducing  labor  demand  and  output  in that
sector.  Laid-off workers  are  absorbed  in the  agricultural  nontraded  sector,
leading  to  an  increase  in output  and  a reduction  in the  product  wage  in
that sector.  By contrast,  in the  formal urban sector,  the rise  in investment
increases  the  private  sector  capital  stock;  because  skilled labor  is  (to some
degree at least)  a substitute to private  physical capital,  this implies that the
demand  for skilled  labor  goes  down,  resulting  in an initial decrease  in out-
put of the formal private  good.  However,  the subsequent switch of unskilled
workers from the informal economy to the formal sector leads to a rise in out-
put in the private  formal sector.  At the same time, it reduces  output in the
informal sector,  but increases  both the product  wage  and  the consumption
wage in the informal economy.
The resulting  smaller  differential  between  average  expected  urban  con-
sumption wages  and rural wages eventually  leads to a dampening  of migra-
tion  flows  into  urban  areas,  which  tend  to  support  the  initial  increase  in
informal sector wages.  There is also  an increase  in the expected skilled con-
sumption  wage and a fall in the expected  unskilled  consumption  wage  (due,
in the case  of the latter, to the increase  in the price  index of the  unskilled
consumption  basket).  This  leads  to  a  higher  rate of skills  acquisition  and
increased  unemployment  relative  to the baseline  scenario.  In terms  of real
per capita consumption,  all working  households  benefit from the increase  in
transfers,  except  the urban unskilled labor  group.
Poverty,  as  measured  by the economy-wide  consumption-based  poverty
headcount  index,  decreases  in the short  run when  savings  from  lower  debt
service  are  applied  to  transfers  to  households.  The  reduction  in  poverty
becomes somewhat  larger in the medium run, but is reduced  in the long run.
46Specifically,  consumption  of the agricultural  traded and  private  formal  sector  goods
increases, whereas  consumption  of informal and public sector goods decreases.
47See our  discussion of the terms-of-trade  shock section  for a more detailed  explanation
of this effect  on the premium.
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rural  and urban informal  sectors.48 Short-  and  long-run  poverty  reduction
is somewhat  larger when using income-based poverty measures, but remains
confined  to the rural sectors.
When using consumption-based poverty gap indices as indicators, poverty
again falls in the short  and the long run,  with a larger  decrease  at a longer
horizon.  However,  in contrast to headcount  indices,  poverty reduction  here
occurs  across  all  unskilled  labor  groups  in the  long  run.  In  the  case  of
income-based  poverty gap measures,  economy-wide  poverty decreases in the
short and long run, confirming results obtained from the consumption-based
poverty gap measure.  Among the four indices of income distribution, the Gini
coefficients show that debt reduction reduces income inequality,  whereas the
Theil indices shows the opposite  result.
6.3.2  Investment  in Infrastructure
The  use  of savings  from  debt  reduction  to  increase  the stock  of capital  in
infrastructure  has  not  only demand-side  effects  but also supply-side  effects
(see  Tables  8  and  9).  We  focus  on the latter,  because  demand-side  effects
are similar to those already described above.  In particular,  higher infrastruc-
ture provides a boost to production in the rural traded, rural nontraded,  and
private formal sectors.  It increases the marginal product of all factors of pro-
duction in these sectors,  given our assumption that infrastructure facilitates
a more efficient  use of available resources.  Therefore demand  for labor goes
up,  as  well  as private  investment.  But there  is  also  an  additional  channel
that contributes to the rise in capital formation,  and that is the reduction in
confiscation risk resulting  from the long-run increase  in tax revenue,  paired
with a cut in interest payments  following the reduction  in external  debt.
These two channels  of transmission have a compounded effect on output
in the private formal sector, which increases  strongly when compared to the
case in which savings from debt relief are used to finance lump-sum transfers.
Skilled labor  unemployment  is reduced in contrast to the transfers scenario.
The  behavior  of the rural  sector  is  quite  different  as  well:  increased  pro-
ductivity  both in the agricultural  traded and nontraded  sectors  leads  to an
expansion in total agricultural  output.  Similar results to those of the trans-
fers policy apply to consumption per capita levels among working households,
48This is mainly due to.the fact that,  in our base-period  calibration,  the share of total
transfers  allocated  to rural households is assumed  to be higher.
71except for agricultural traded households who experience  declining consump-
tion levels.
Consumption-based  poverty headcount  indices show that debt reduction
has no effect on poverty in the short run, but it does have some positive effects
in the long run.  The latter  is mainly  due to poverty  reduction  in the rural
nontraded  sector.  Similarly,  income-based  poverty  headcount  indices  show
that poverty  is reduced only in the long run,  and the main  gains accrue  to
households  in the rural  nontraded  sector.  The  consumption-based  poverty
gap  index  indicates  that poverty  decreases  in both  the short  and the  long
run, with long-run gains being significantly  larger.  This reduction in poverty
occurs  for  all  unskilled  labor  groups  in  the  long run.  Looking  at  income-
based  poverty gap measures,  we  observe that poverty  increases  in the rural
traded  and  urban  unskilled  households  almost  outweigh  poverty  decreases
among rural nontraded and urban informal labor households in the long run,
resulting  in  a small  decrease  in the  aggregate  poverty  gap  index.  Finally,
the results indicate that income distribution, both in the short  and the long
run,  becomes more  (less)  egalitarian  when we use the Gini coefficient  (Theil
index),  and that improvements  are more significant  at a longer  horizon.
Interestingly  enough, on comparing the effects of poverty reduction when
savings are allocated to infrastructure relative to the effects under a transfers
policy,  we find that every  poverty  indicator  under the first  scenario,  except
the  income-based  poverty  gap,  outperforms  indicators  under the  transfers
scenario  in the  long run.  The  fact  that  investment  in  infrastructure  shifts
the private sector production possibility frontier  (whereas the transfers  pol-
icy does  not) explains why poverty  reduction may be more significant  when
resources  are devoted to infrastructure instead of transfers.
6.3.3  Investment  in Education
Investment  in education  provides  incentives  for  higher  skills  acquisition  by
unskilled urban workers and this has a direct  impact on the supply of skilled
labor  (see  Tables  10  and  11).  Debt  reduction  leads to an increase  in open
unemployment  of skilled labor,  in spite of increasing investment due to lower
confiscation risk, because private capital  and skilled labor are substitutes  in
production.  Moreover,  skills  acquisition  grows  at  a faster  pace than labor
demand  over  time,  implying  that  open  unemployment  starts  accelerating.
This highlights the importance of considering both demand- and supply-side
effects in designing policy reforms.  For instance, we have performed  a simula-
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education whereas the other half is allocated to investment in infrastructure.
This mixed policy yields better results  (in the sense of skilled unemployment
being much lower) than the case in which public savings associated with debt
relief are  fully allocated to investment in education.
As  urban  unskilled  workers  enter  the  skilled  labor  force,  and  informal
workers  are absorbed  into the formal sector, the expected  average  wage  for
unskilled workers in the urban labor market  decreases  (despite the fact that
excess  demand for labor in the informal sector tends to put upward pressure
on  wages  there),  but  a  larger  initial  decline  in  agricultural  wages  creates
incentives to migrate from rural areas.  This pushes  workers out of the rural
sector and into the urban unskilled  labor market.  However,  migration flows
are reversed  in the  long run  as  (expected)  urban unskilled  wages starts  to
decline.
Consumption-based poverty headcount indices show no decrease in poverty
in the short run, and only workers in the agricultural nontraded sector benefit
from poverty reduction in the long run.  The aggregate income-based poverty
headcount  index shows little change in either the short or the long run.  The
economy-wide,  consumption-based  poverty  gap  index  shows  a  decrease  in
both  the  short  and  the  long  run.  In the  short  run,  decreases  in  poverty
gaps take place  for rural non-traded  and urban informal groups;  in the long
run,  decreases  are only  observed  for  urban  unskilled  household  categories,
including  formal and informal unskilled  workers.  Income-based  poverty gap
indices  indicate  a  decrease  in the  poverty gap  in the  rural  non-traded  and
urban informal sectors in the short run; this translates into a decrease in the
aggregate  poverty gap,  despite  an increase in the value of that indicator for
rural  traded  and  urban  formal  unskilled  households.  However,  in the  long
run  poverty  increases  in  the rural  and  urban  unskilled  groups  are  greater
than the poverty  reduction  in the urban  informal  group.  This  leads to  an
increase in the aggregate  poverty gap in the long run.  Finally,  indices of in-
come distribution again convey a mixed picture;  the Gini coefficient  shows  a
more egalitarian distribution whereas the Theil index indicates the opposite.
Poverty reduction under this scenario is clearly not as substantial as in the
case where savings are allocated  to infrastructure.  This is due in part to the
fact  that investment  in education  does not necessarily translate  into a shift
in the private sector production possibilities frontier (PPF) as long as newly-
skilled workers remain unemployed,  whereas investment in infrastructure  (as
indicated earlier)  does so unambiguously.  Comparison between investment in
73education vs.  a transfers policy is more ambiguous,  as results vary depending
on the chosen indicators.
7  Conclusions
The purpose  of this  paper  has  been  to  present  an integrated  quantitative
macroeconomic  framework  developed  recently  at  the  World  Bank  for  the
purpose  of analyzing  the impact  of policy  and  external  shocks  on  income
distribution  and poverty  in  developing  countries.  The prototype  described
in this paper captures  important  structural  features  of low-income,  highly-
indebted countries:  the existence of a negative relation between external debt
and private  investment,  a large  urban informal  economy,  a limited menu of
financial  assets,  the impact  of credit  constraints  on the decision  to acquire
skills, and a predominant role of banks in the economy.  Taken together, these
features  create a variety  of channels through which adjustment policies may
affect  growth and poverty in the short  and the long run.49
Section  II  discussed  the main  features  of the  model  and  how  they  af-
fect  the transmission  channels  of policy  and exogenous  shocks.  Section  III
provided  a detailed analytical presentation  of the model's structure and Sec-
tion  IV  discussed  calibration  and  solution issues.  Section  V  analyzed  the
results  of several  simulation  experiments.  In  particular,  we used the model
to  analyze  a temporary  terms-of-trade  shock,  a  permanent  cut  in  domes-
tic  credit  to the  government,  and  a poverty-reduction  program  consisting
of partial  external  debt  forgiveness  coupled  with  a  reallocation  of savings
on debt  service  payments.  The latter  experiment  is  particularly  important
for many low-income  countries.  Recent international  evidence  suggests  that
external  debt remains  at unsustainable  levels in many  poor  countries,  even
after accounting for aid from international debt relief programs.  For sure, the
direct short-term impact  of debt reduction is to reduce pressure  on the gov-
ernment  budget  constraint;  and if one  considers  a country  starting  from an
initially high fiscal deficit  (with a high degree of monetization and inflation,
or a significant  crowding-out  effect  on the  private  sector)  then it  is  indeed
be beneficial to allocate savings  from debt reduction to reducing the deficit.
49We described  in another  paper  (see  Agenor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,  and  van der  Mens-
brugghe (2003))  how the prototype version described here should be amended or modified
to make it more suitable  for the analysis  of poverty-reduction  strategies in middle-income
countries.
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location of expenditure  should  be in  order to maximize the  impact  of debt
relief on poverty  reduction.  Our  model  allows  us to  address  this question.
Specifically,  we considered  an experiment that consists of a permanent cut in
the level of external debt, with the savings resulting  from lower debt service
being allocated  to either lump-sum transfers to households,  expenditure  on
infrastructure  (which has complementary effects on private investment and a
direct effect  on the productivity of private inputs),  education  (which affects
incentives to acquire skills),  or education and health (which raises productiv-
ity of the labor force).  The results illustrated the importance  of accounting
for the various channels through which poverty alleviation programs  based on
debt reduction and expenditure reallocation  may ultimately affect the poor.
The model that  we  have  developed  can  be used  to analyze  a variety  of
other policy shocks-such as a reduction in external tariffs, fiscal adjustment
(such as public sector layoffs  or changes in the structure of income taxes,  for
instance),  labor market reforms (such as changes in the minimum wage), a de-
valuation of the nominal exchange rate,  or a financial liberalization program
based on an increase in bank deposit rates.  An important point that we want
to emphasize  is that our  model is not meant to be applied  "blindly"  to any
particular country.  Although the "prototype"  version described in this paper
is general enough to be applied to a variety of cases (at least as a  "first pass")
we view our framework  as  a flexible tool that can  (and should)  be amended
or extended to fit particular  circumstances  and needs.  For instance, regard-
ing the credit market, whether the  "collateral"  view or the  "monitoring and
enforcement costs"  view are appropriate should be gauged on the basis of the
evidence  on the determinants  of interest  rate spreads.i0 More  generally,  we
have  assumed that  the credit  market  clears  because  commercial  banks  can
borrow (and lend)  as much as they desire on world capital  markets;  if banks
are unable to do so,  it could  be assumed  that they carry significant  excess
liquid reserves  that would play the equilibrating  role.  Alternatively,  credit
rationing  can  be  introduced  (see,  for instance,  Decaluwe  and  Nsengiyumva
(1994)),  with possibly significant  implications  for the behavior of private  in-
vestment  and  the behavior  of output  in the  short  term.  Finally,  we  have
completely  ignored informal  financial markets.  A good  argument  for  doing
50Note that, in practice,  although interest rate spreads reflect the riskiness of loans they
are not  strictly speaking  measures  of  borrowers'  risk,  because  the  amount  lent  may  be
rationed or  may reflect lenders'  perceptions of risk.
75so is that financial liberalization in many developing countries has proceeded
to such an extent that these markets  play  a much less prominent  role than
they used to.  However,  it is also true that in some countries (mostly  in sub-
Saharan  Africa)  informal  credit markets  continue to play  a significant  role
in the financial system.  Modeling the channels through which such markets
operate  could proceed along the lines of Agenor,  Montiel  and Haque  (1993)
but would add another layer  of complexity.
There are several  other changes in, or extensions of, our prototype frame-
work  that may  be worth  pondering,  depending  on  country  circumstances.
In particular,  we  did not  account  in  our  analysis  for the possibility  of un-
skilled  unemployment.  We assumed,  as  does the  "conventional"  view,  that
the  urban informal  labor  market  is  characterized  by  ease  of entry,  a high
degree of wage flexibility,  and limited labor  protection.  As a result,  adverse
shocks to the formal economy tend to translate into lower  (average)  produc-
tivity in the  informal  sector.  However,  despite  the  absence  of restrictions
to entry  in the informal sector,  urban open unemployment  is often  high in
developing  countries,  and tends to affect  both skilled and unskilled workers
(which account  for  the majority  of the poor).  This  evidence  suggests that
the extent  of labor mobility between the formal and the informal sectors, al-
though very  high, is not perfect.  Our analysis  could be extended  to account
for  unskilled  unemployment  along the lines  of Agenor  (1999,  2003) for in-
stance,  who argued that informational  frictions  may force  unskilled workers
to remain unemployed while they are searching for a job in the formal sector.
As a result,  a Harris-Todaro  type mechanism  can be used to determine the
supply of unskilled  labor to the formal sector.
Another  issue that  requires  some  more  thinking  is  how to  endogenize
productivity growth,  in addition to the level effects that efficiency wage con-
siderations  bring  in the  model  and  the  endogenous  fertility  rate.  Recent
studies,  most  notably by Easterly  and Levine  (2001),  have emphasized  the
importance of total factor productivity (TFP)  growth in accounting for out-
put growth  in developing  countries.  One possibility could be to relate  effort
to the capital-labor ratio, through an Arrow-type  "learning by doing"  mech-
anism  (see  for instance Villanueva  (1994)).  A second  possibility is to relate
TFP  growth  to  policy  variables  that  may  affect  incentives  to  acquire  and
use  new technologies  or to use resources  efficiently.  Yet  another  possibility,
following Lee  (1995),  is to endogenize  growth by accounting  for the transfer
of technology  and know-how  that occurs  through imports of capital  goods.
Such goods account  for an important share part of total imports and domes-
76tic investment of developing countries  (see, for instance,  Agenor and Montiel
(1999,  Chapter 1))  and have been shown to have a significant  impact on per
capita income growth in cross-section and panel data studies  (see Lee  (1995)
and Mazumdar  (2001)).
These  possible  modifications  and  extensions to adapt our  framework  to
particular  country circumstances  also  lead us  to emphasize  the importance
of adequate  econometric  research  to estimate  key  behavioral  relationships
and  provide  reliable  parameters  for calibration  purposes.  For instance,  as-
sessing whether private investment is responsive to the debt-to-taxes ratio or
not matters a great  deal in assessing  the incentive effects  of debt reduction;
and  determining  whether  the stock  of public  capital  in  infrastructure  has
a large  complementarity  effect  on private  investment  is  crucial to calculate
the growth implications of alternative investment allocation strategies by the
public sector.  Likewise,  estimating the parameters  of the rural-urban migra-
tion function  (and whether factors that income differentials  matter),  as well
as the skills acquisition function, is essential to assess the medium- and long-
term  effects  of policy  shocks  on poverty.  Finally,  assessing  the sensitivity
of the finance  premium to the ratio of borrowers'  net  worth to the amount
lent  is also  critical  to assess  the degree  of interaction  between the real and
financial  sectors.
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92Appendix  B
Variable Names  and Definitions
Endogenous  Variables5 '
Name  Definition
Ci  Aggregate  consumption  of good i = AN, G, I,  P
CONh  Consumption by household  h
CPI  Weighted  average of composite good prices
Di  Domestic demand for domestic  good i = AN,  P
DDh  Domestic deposits by household  h
DEF  Government  deficit
dev  Expected devaluation  rate
DLP  Domestic loan by private  urban formal firm
Ei  Export of traded  good i = AT,  P
ef  Effort
Ewu  Expected urban unskilled wages
EWA  Expected agricultural  wages
Ews  Expected skilled  wages
FDh  Foreign deposits by household h
FF  Foreign  reserves
FLB  Banks'  foreign  liabilities
G  Government  expenditures
Gi  Government  spending in good i  AN,  G, I,  P
HS  Money  supply
Hh  Money  held by household  h
Hhd  Money  demand by household  h
IK  Return from equities
IL  Interest rate for domestic loan
INTi  Intermediate  good demand for good i
KE  Capital in education
KG  Public capital
KH  Capital in health
KINF  Capital in infrastructure
KP  Private capital
51The index i (respectively,  h) is  used below to refer to all production sectors (household
groups,  respectively),  that is,  AT,  AN,  G, I,  P  (AN,  AT,  UI,  UF, KAP, R, US, UU,
respectively),  unless otherwise  indicated.
93Mi  Import  of good i = AN,  P
MB  Money base
MIGR  Migration to urban area
NWPB  Net worth of banks
NWps  Net worth of the consolidated  public sector
NWCB  Net worth of the central bank
NWi  Net worth of sector i = P,  G
Qw  Opportunity  cost (wage)  for skilled workers
PR  Rural price index
PDi  Domestic  price of domestic sales of good i = AN,  P
PEi  Price of exported traded good i = AT,  P
PGDPFC  Price deflator  for RGDP at factor  cost
PINF  Inflation rate
PINDi  Price indeces  used to index nominal wages  where i = S, AT,  M
PK  Price of capital
PLEV  Price level  ( PLEV_EQ  with partial  adjustments)
PLEVe  Price level equilibrating the money market
PMi  Price of imported good i = AN,  P
PQi  Composite  good price of good i = AN, G, I,  P
PR  Premium
PROF,  Profit by good i firm where i = AN, AT,  I,  P
PT1 Price of T1
PT2 Price of T2
Ph  Urban price index for household h = US,  UU
PVi  Value added price of good i
PXi  Sale price of good i
Qi  Demand of composite good i = AN,  G, I, P
Qid  Demand  of good i = AN, G, I,  P
Q5  Supply of good i = AN,  G, I, P
RGDPFC  Real GDP at factor cost
RR  Reserve requirements
S  Skilled workers
SAVh  Saving by household  h
Savrateh  Saving rate for household  h
SKL  New skilled workers
SP  Skilled  labor employed  in private urban formal
Sdp  Demand for skilled labor in private urban formal
94T,  Composite input from T2 and unskilled labor
T2  Composite input from capital and skilled labor
TRH  Transfers to households
TXREV  Tax revenues
Ui  Unskilled  labor employed  in sectors i = AN,  AT,  I,  P
Uid  Unskilled  labor demand in sectors i = AN,  AT, I,  P
Uis  Unskilled  labor supply in sectors i = AN,  I
UNEMPs  Unemployment  of skilled workers
UR  Unskilled workers in rural economy
Uu  Unskilled workers  in urban economy
Vi  Value added in good i
Wi  Nominal wage for unskilled labor in sector i = AN,  AT,  I
Wi  Real wage  rate for unskilled labor in sector i = I
WM  Nominal wage rate for unskilled labor in the private formal sector
WM  Real wage rate for unskilled labor in the private formal sector
Ws  Nominal  wage rate for skilled labor
wS  Real wage rate for skilled  labor
WTh  Total wealth by household  h
Xi  Production  of good i
YFi  Income by good i firm where i = AN,  AT,  I,  P
YFPB  Income by private bank
YHh  Household  income for h
Z  Total investment
Zi  Investment  demand  for good i = G,  P
95Exogenous  Variables
Name  Definition
DCG  Domestic credit to government
DLG  Domestic loans to government
ER  Nominal exchange rate
FLi  Foreign loans to sector i = G,  P
Gc  Government  consumption
9R  Population growth in rural economy
gu  Population growth in urban economy
ID  Interest  rate on domestic deposits
IE  Investment  in education
IF  Interest  rate on foreign  deposit
IF0 Interest rate on government  foreign loans
IH  Investment in health
IINF  Investment in infrastructure
inctaXh  Income tax for household  h = KAP, R, US,  UU
indtaxi  Sales tax rate on good i = AN,  AT, P,  G
SG  Skilled workers  in public sector
tei  Export  subsidy for good i =  A(agricultural  good),  P
tmj  Import  tariff for good i = A  (agricultural good),  P
UG  Unskilled  workers in public sector
wi  Real wage rate in sector i = AN,  AT
wpei  World price of export  of good i = A (agricultural good),  P
wpmi  World price of import of good i = A  (agricultural good),  P
96Parameters
Name  Definition
aij  Input-output coefficient  for good i and j
(ab  Share of domestic funding in total bank funding
aedu  Elasticity of skills acquisition to cost of education
aXG  Shift parameter  for public capital
ag9u  Shift parameter  for urban unskilled worker  population growth rate
aQi  Shift parameter  in composite good i = A (agricultural  good),  P
arTP  Shift parameter  in transformation  function between  exported
and domestic  private production
aixi  Shift parameter in production  of good  i
axpi  Shift parameter in composite  input of unskilled and skilled/capital
composite  input
cxXP2  Shift parameter in composite input of skilled workers and private
capital
fiG  Shift parameter for public capital
/3QA  Shift  parameter in agricultural  composite good
I3QP  Shift  parameter in urban composite good
/3TP  Shift parameter between exported  and domestic private production
13xi  Shift parameter  in production of good i = AN,  AT
I3XG1  Shift parameter  between labor and public  capital in public production
O1XG2  Shift parameter  between skilled  and unskilled  workers
in public production
I3xI  Shift parameter  in informal  production
B3xp  Share parameter  between inputs and public capital in
private production
I3xpl  Share parameter  between unskilled and skilled/capital
composite  input
3XP2  Share parameter between skilled  workers and private capital
fhD  Money  demand elasticity on domestic rate
/
3hF  Money  demand elasticity  on foreign rate
/3 hPINF  Money demand  elasticity on inflation
ccij  Shares of household  consumption in goods i and j
bc  Collateral  parameter
6E  Depreciation of education capital
6H  Depreciation  of health capital
6INF  Depreciation  of infrastructure
976p  Private capital's depreciation  rate
efm  Minimum effort  level
Partial adjustment  coefficient  for premium
??xi  Coefficient  of returns to scale for good i = AN,  AT
YBi  Share of domestic  deposits in total deposits  for household  h
-1gU  Elasticity  of urban unskilled worker population growth rate to
the proportion  of skilled workers  in total urban population
'Yef  Elasticity of of effort to wages
'ah  Share of transfers allocated to household  h
-Yp,,  Elasticity of premium to firms'  net worth position
ggi  Share of government  expenditure on good i = AN,  I,  G,  P
KsE  Shift parameter  in skills acquisition  function
IC5  Shift parameter  for skilled private sector employment
Ag  Coefficient  of distributed lag of effect of past income on growth rate
of urban unskilled population
Am  Partial adjustment rate on migration
A,PI  Premium  shift parameter
A,  Partial  adjustment rate on skills  acquisition
Qw  Shift parameter  of skilled reservation  wage function
OD  Shift parameter  of external debt effect
ODD  Shift parameter  of external  debt effect
q5u  Elasticity of skilled reservation  wage to the unemployment  rate
of skilled workers
inds  Elasticity of skilled nominal  wage to the skilled price index
(O)k  Parameters  used in calculating  skilled  nominal wage  k = 1, 2,3
Shift parameter  of rate of return to capital
OkBh  Domestic/foreign  deposits shift parameter  for household  h
re  Percentage  of profits retained
PG  Substitution parameter  for public  capital
PQi  Substitution parameter  in composite  good i = A  (agricultural  good),  P
PTP  Substitution parameter  between exported and domestic  private
production
Pxi  Substitution parameter  in production  of good i =  AN,  AT
PXG1  Substitution parameter  between workers  and public capital
in public production
PXG2  Substitution parameter  between skilled and unskilled workers
in public production
98Pxp  Substitution parameter  between inputs  and public  capital  in
private  production
Pxp1  Substitution parameter  between unskilled and skilled/capital
composite  input
PXP2  Substitution  parameter  between skilled workers and private capital
rreq  Reserve  requirement ratio
uACC  Elasticity of investment to growth rate of real  GDP at factor cost
UBh  Domestic/foreign  deposits elasticity for household  h
aE  Elasticity of skills acquisition to capital in education
aH  Money demand elasticity  on real income
alj  Elasticity of rate of return to capital
UIK  Elasticity of investment to return to capital
a'K  Elasticity of investment to gross growth rate of infrastructure  capital
UM  Elasticity of migration to wage differentials
ap  Elasticity of inflation on investment
UQi  Elasticity of composite good i = A (agricultural  good),  P
OS,h  Elasticity of saving rate to deposit rate
UTP  Elasticity of transformation  between exported  and
domestic private production
aw  Elasticity of skills acquisition to wage  differential
Uxpi  Elasticity of substitution  between  unskilled workers  and composite
input of skilled workers  and private capital
UXp2  Elasticity of substitution  between skilled workers  and private capital
So,h  Saving coefficient  for household  h
OR  Share of rural workers  employed  in traded sector
ou  Share of urban unskilled  workers  employed in formal sector
0,  Initial ratio of the number of workers  employed in the private sector
vi  Weight for good i real GDP at factor cost  price deflator
wti  Initial share of good i in aggregate consumption for i = A,  I,  P,  G
wr1 Initial share of good i in rural consumption  for i = A,  I,  P,  G
wsi  Initial share of good i in skilled  workers'  consumption
wui  Initial share of good i in urban unskilled workers'  consumption
for i = A,  I, P,  G




axpl  Elasticity  of substitution  between unskilled  workers and  1.2000
composite  input of skilled workers and private capital
CXP2  Elasticity  of substitution between  skilled workers  0.4000
and private capital
a7TP  Elasticity of transformation  between exported and  1.0100
domestic  private production
aXAN  Shift parameter  in nontraded agricultural  production  0.5407
,/XAN  Share parameter  in nontraded agricultural  production  0.6310
PXAN  Substitution parameter  in nontraded  agricultural production  0.3333
aXAT  Shift parameter  in traded agricultural production  0.7944
/3XAT  Share parameter  in traded  agricultural  production  0.9151
PXAT  Substitution  parameter in traded agricultural  production  0.3333
C!x/  Shift parameter in informal production  0.1315
oxi  Share parameter.in  informal production  0.1500
QXG  Shift parameter in public production  4.0000
,3XGi  Share parameter  between  labor and public capital  0.8953
in public production
1XG2  Share parameter  between skilled  and unskilled  0.7605
workers in public production
PXGI  Substitution parameter  between workers and  0.3333
public capital in public production
PXG2  Substitution parameter  between skilled and  0.1667
unskilled workers  in public production
°xP  Shift parameter  in private production  0.3393
/3 xp  Share parameter  between  inputs and public  0.8953
capital in private production
Pxp  Substitution parameter  between inputs  and public  0.3333
capital  in private production
°xpi  Shift parameter  in composite  input of unskilled  28.5784
and skilled/capital composite  input
(3xpl  Share parameter  between unskilled  and  0.0310
skilled/capital  composite input
PxP1  Substitution parameter  between  unskilled  0.1667
and skilled/capital composite  input
100aXP2  Shift parameter  in composite input of skilled  4.6174
workers and private capital
1 3XP2  Share parameter  between  skilled workers  0.0350
and private capital
PXP2  Substitution parameter between  skilled workers  1.5000
and private  capital
aTP  Shift parameter  in transformation function between  2.1201
exported and domestic private production
/TP  Share parameter  between exported  and domestic  0.3349
private production
PTP  Substitution parameter  between  exported and  1.9901
domestic  private production
aAN,AN  Input-output  coefficient  0.0500
aAT,AN  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aI,AN  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aP,AN  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aG,AN  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aAN,AT  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aAT,AT  Input-output  coefficient  0.0500
aI,AT  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aP,AT  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aG,AT  Input-output  coefficient  0.2000
aAN,I  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aAT,I  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
a1,,  Input-output  coefficient  0.0500
ap,j  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aG,I  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aAN,P  Input-output  coefficient  O4000
aAT,P  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aj,p  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
ap,p  Input-output  coefficient  0.2000
aG,P  Input-output  coefficient  0.2000
aAN,G  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aAT,G  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
aj,G  Input-output  coefficient  0.0000
ap,G  Input-output  coefficient  0.1000
aG,G  Input-output coefficient  0.0000
101817XAN  Coefficient  of returns to scale  0.30
1XAT  Coefficient  of returns to scale  0.30
Employment
'Yef  Elasticity of effort to wages  0.1701
efm  Minimum effort  level  0.2356
9!R  Population growth in rural economy  0.0222
ou  Share of urban unskilled workers  employed  0.2222
in formal sector
OR  Share of rural workers  employed  in traded sector  0.5000
a'M  Elasticity of migration to wage  differentials  0.5000
ICE  Shift parameter  in skills acquisition function  0.0150
ow  Elasticity of skills acquisition to wage differential  0.5000
UJE  Elasticity of skills acqusition to capital  in education  0.8273
A\m  Partial adjustment rate on migration  0.3000
A,  Partial adjustment rate on skills acquisition  0.3000
Kcs  Shift parameter  for skilled private  employment  0.3946
agu  Shift parameter  for urban unskilled worker  0.0210
population growth rate
'Y 9U  Elasticity of urban unskilled worker  population  0.1000
growth rate to the proportion of skilled  workers
in total urban population
Ceedu  Elasticity of skills acqusition  to cost of education  0.1000
Qw  Shift parameter  for skilled reservation  wage function  1.0000
ou  Elasticity of skilled reservation  wage to  0.0000
the unemployment  rate of skilled workers
inds  Elasticity of skilled nominal  wage to the skilled price index  1.00
Ag  Coefficient  of distributed lag of effect  of past  0.0000
income on growth rate of urban unskilled population
08  Initial ratio of the number  of workers  employed  0.1000
in the private sector
Demand
aQA  Elasticity of agricultural composite  good  0.8000
CYQP  Elasticity of private urban composite  good  1.0100
akQA  Shift parameter  in agricultural  composite good  2.0000
fQA  Share parameter  in agricultural  composite good  0.5000
PQA  Substitution parameter  in agricultural  composite good  0.2500
0eQp  Shift parameter  in urban composite good  1.6519
102OQP  Share parameter  in urban composite good  0.7978
PQP  Substitution  parameter  in urban composite good  -0.0100
CCAN,A  Shares of household consumption in goods  0.5000
CCAT,A  Shares of household consumption  in goods  0.5000
CCA,UI  Shares of household  consumption in goods  0.1500
CCA,UF  Shares of household consumption in goods  0.2000
CCA,US  Shares  of household consumption in goods  0.1000
CCA,KAp  Shares  of household consumption in goods  0.1000
CCI,NA  Shares of household consumption in goods  0.0500
CCI,TA  Shares of household consumption  in goods  0.0500
CCi,UI  Shares of household  consumption in goods  0.7992
CCI,UF  Shares  of household  consumption in goods  0.1158
ccI,US  Shares  of household  consumption  in goods  0.0600
CCI,KAP  Shares  of household  consumption in goods  0.0200
CCG,NA  Shares of household consumption in goods  0.1711
CCG,TA  Shares  of household consumption in goods  0.1711
CCG,UI  Shares  of household consumption in goods  0.0200
CCG,UF  Shares  of household  consumption in goods  0.2500
CCG,US  Shares  of household  consumption in goods  0.1832
CCG,KAP  Shares  of household consumption  in goods  0.1950
CCP,NA  Shares  of household consumption  in goods  0.2789
CCP,TA  Shares  of household consumption  in goods  0.2789
CCp,UI  Shares of household consumption  in goods  0.0308
CCP,UF  Shares of household consumption  in goods  0.4342
CCP,US  Shares of household  consumption  in goods  0.6568
CCP,KAP  Shares of household consumption  in goods  0.6850
99AN  Share  of government expenditure  on nontraded  0.0000
agricultural  goods
99I  Share  of government  expenditure on informal goods  0.0000
99G  Share  of government expenditure  on public  goods  0.0000
ggp  Share  of government expenditure  on formal private goods  1.0000
ZZAN  Share  of investment  expenditure on agricultural goods  0.0000
zz,  Share of investment  expenditure on informal goods  0.0000
ZZG  Share of investment  expenditure on public goods  0.3684
zzp  Share of investment expenditure  on formal  private goods  0.6316
Prices
WtA  Share of agriculture in aggregate  demand  0.2000
wtg  Share of government in aggregate  demand  0.2000
103wtp  Share of private urban good in aggregate  demand  0.5000
wt1 Share of informal good in aggregate  demand  0.1000
wrA  Share of agricultural  good in rural consumption  0.5000
wrG  Share of government  good in rural consumption  0.1711
wrp  Share of private urban good in rural consumption  0.2789
wr1 Share of informal good in rural consumption  0.0500
WUA  Share of agricultural  good in urban unskilled  0.1750
workers'  consumption
WUG  Share of government  good in urban unskilled  0.1350
workers'  consumption
wup  Share of private  urban good in urban unskilled  0.2325
workers'  consumption
W 1s  Share of informal  good in urban unskilled  0.4575
workers'  consumption
WSA  Share of agricultural  good in skilled workers'  0.1000
consumption
WSG  Share of government  good in skilled workers'  0.1832
consumption
WSp  Share  of private urban good in skilled workers'  0.6568
consumption
ws1 Share of informal good in skilled workers'  0.0600
consumption
Van  Weight  for AN  real GDP at factor  cost  price deflator  0.0589
Vat  Weight  for AT  real GDP  at factor  cost price deflator  0.2347
vi  Weight  for I real GDP at factor  cost price deflator  0.0721
vp  Weight  for P real GDP at factor  cost price deflator  0.3852
Vg  Weight  for G real  GDP at factor  cost price deflator  0.2492
Income
re  Percentage  of profits retained  0.2020
US,h  Elasticity  of saving rate to deposit rate  0.5000
So,AN  Saving  coefficient  for  agricultural  0.1623
workers  in nontraded  sector
So,AT  Saving coefficient  for  agricultural  0.1063
workers  in traded sector
So,UI  Saving  coefficient  for unskilled  urban  0.2027
workers in informal  economy
So,UF  Saving  coefficient  for unskilled urban  0.1063
workers in formal economy
104sO,US  Saving coefficient  for skilled workers  0.1063
So,KAP  Saving coefficient  for capitalists  0.1063
'YAN  Share of transfers allocated to workers  0.1667
in agricultural  nontraded sector
'YAT  Share of transfers allocated to workers  0.5000
in agricultural traded sector
'Yui  Share of transfers  allocated to workers  0.0000
in urban informal  sector
YUF  Share of transfers  allocated to workers  0.0833
in urban formal sector
'Ys  Share of transfers  allocated to workers  0.2500
in skilled sector
'YKAP  Share of transfers  allocated to capitalists  0.0000
Financial Sector
16p  Private capital's  depreciation rate  0.1092
ABAN  Domestic/foreign  deposits  shift parameter  2.9603
(BAT  Domestic/foreign  deposits shift parameter  2.9603
OBUI  Domestic/foreign  deposits shift parameter  2.9603
OBUF  Domestic/foreign  deposits  shift parameter  2.9603
OBS  Domestic/foreign  deposits shift parameter  2.9603
OBKAP  Domestic/foreign  deposits shift parameter  2.9603
0'BAN  Domestic/foreign  deposits elasticity  0.7000
OJBAT  Domestic/foreign  deposits elasticity  0.7000
uBUI  Domestic/foreign  deposits  elasticity  0.7000
uBUF  Domestic/foreign  deposits elasticity  0.7000
C'BS  Domestic/foreign  deposits  elasticity  0.7000
'7BKAP  Domestic/foreign  deposits elasticity  0.7000
Oz  Shift parameter  of rate of return to capital  0.1738
OD  Shift parameter of external  debt effect  0.0092
ODD  Shift parameter  of external  debt effect  0.0199
UI  Elasticity of rate of return to capital  0.8000
ap  Elasticity of inflation on investment  0.1000
IhD  Money demand elasticity  on domestic rate  0.5000
/hF  Money demand elasticity  on foreign rate  0.5000
/3 hPINF  Money demand elasticity on inflation  0.5000
(aH  Money demand elasticity on real income  1.0000
'YBAN  Share of domestic  deposits in total deposits  0.75
'YBAT  Share of domestic  deposits in total deposits  0.75
105YBKAP  Share of domestic  deposits in total deposits  0.75
'YBS  Share of domestic deposits in total deposits  0.75
'YBUF  Share of domestic  deposits in total deposits  0.75
'YBUI  Share  of domestic  deposits in total deposits  0.75
C'IK  Elasticity of investment to return to capital  0.8000
aYb  Share of domestic  funding in total bank funding  0.9000
Ypr  Elasticity of premium to firms'  net worth position  0.0500
PIpr  Premium shift parameter  1.0934
',pr  Partial adjustment  coefficient  for premium  1.0000
bc  Collateral  parameter  0.1475
UK  Elasticity of investment to gross growth rate of  0.1000
infrastructure  capital
C
7ACC  Elasticity of investment to growth rate of real  0.05
GDP at factor cost
Public Sector
aUG  Shift parameter  for public capital  0.2140
/BG  Share parameter  for public capital  0.7500
PG  Substitution parameter  for public  capital  0.3333
6INF  Depreciation  of infrastructure  0.0100
6H  Depreciation of health capital  0.1400
6E  Depreciation  of education  capital  .0.1400
rreq  Reserve requirement  ratio  0.1000
106Table  1
IMMPA:  Financial  Balance  Sheets
(in domestic-currency  terms, at current  prices)
Households
Assets  Liabilities
Cash  holdings  (H)  Financial  wealth (WT)
Domestic bank deposits (DD)
Foreign bank deposits  (ER .FD)
Firms
Assets  Liabilities
Stock of private capital (PK. Kp)  1  Domestic  borrowing from banks  (DLP)




Domestic loans to government  (DLG)  Domestic  bank deposits (DD)
Domestic loans  to firms  (DLp)  Banks'  foreign liabilities  (ER. FLB)
Reserve requirements  (RR)  Net worth (NWB)
Central Bank
Assets  Liabilities
Loans to government  (DCG)  Cash in circulation (H)




Capital in education (PK. KE)  Loans from central bank (DCG)
Capital in health (PK  KH)  Loans from commercial  banks  (DLG)
Capital in infrastructure  (PK  * KINF)  Foreign borrowing (ER.FLG)
Net worth  (NWG)
Consolidated  Public Sector
Assets  Liabilities
Capital in education  (PK  KE)  Cash in circulation  (H)
Capital in health  (PK  KH)  Reserve requirements  (RR)
Capital in infrastructure  (PK * KINF)  Loans  from commercial banks  (DLG)
Foreign  reserves (ER * FF)  Foreign loans to government  (ER.  FLG)
Net worth (NWps)
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Initial Distribution of Income, Based on Log-Normal Approximation
(obs denotes the number of households in each group)
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125Figure 9
Initial Distribution of Consumption,  Based  on Log-Normal Approximation
(obs denotes the number of households in each group)
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